

Reacquainting the Academic Bureaucracy of Social Science with Its Subjects

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ABSTRACT In this essay, we will first explain the common scholarly arguments and societal reforms that brought about bureaucratic specialization in both academia and the federal bureaucracy. Next, we will discuss criticisms of bureaucratic specialization. We will then explain flaws in David Ricci's (1984) proposed solutions to this conundrum. We will conclude by offering four alternative remedies bent on reconnecting political scientists, government agents, and citizens to one another. The first remedy suggests broad acceptance of multiple research and methodological approaches to social science inquiry. The second solution asks social science scholars to forge reciprocal links with citizens. The third suggestion specifically argues that public administration, as one of the most practical of the social sciences, can serve as a lodestar for reconnecting citizens with academia. Finally, we explain the duty that citizens have to learn about social science and citizenship.

INTRODUCTION

David Ricci's (1984) *The Tragedy of Political Science* laments the tension between a given political scientist's commitment to "scientific political inquiry" versus her commitment to "democratic politics" (pp. 23-24). Ricci believes that the former commitment has served to obfuscate the latter. This, in turn, has caused political science to become highly specialized and technocratic. The ultimate result of the emphasis on science, Ricci claims, is a vast chasm between political science scholars and the public at large. This is evidenced not only in the goals, but also in the practices, of political science departments and their respective faculty members. In larger perspective, Ricci's criticisms of academic bureaucracy are parallel to common complaints centered on the bureaucratologies of government agencies. In this essay, we will first explain the common scholarly arguments and societal reforms that brought about bureaucratic specialization in both academia and the federal bureaucracy. Next, we will discuss criticisms of bureaucratic specialization. We will then explain flaws in Ricci's proposed solutions. We will conclude by offering alternative remedies bent on reconnecting political scientists, government agents, and citizens to one another.

METHODOLOGY

Through reviewing and analyzing the

literature, we seek to illuminate academic shortcomings, identify problems, and suggest some solutions for how political scientists can reconnect their scholarship and research with the greater world around them. This paper is based on a comparative methodology whereby we link the shortcomings in academic bureaucracy with those of the United States bureaucracy and citizenry. In doing so, we are able to borrow from the vast literature centering on the improvement of government and public administration and apply concepts and ideas from this literature to address the dilemma that Ricci discusses. Another important feature of our methodology is evidenced in our application of tenets from recent citizen participation literature to the quandary that we have presented.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of this chosen comparative methodology are embodied in analysis that results in a set of prescriptions which, if properly implemented, might reunite social scientists with the human beings that they study.

The Dawn of Technocracy

In Ricci's words, political scientists have largely abandoned their collective commitment to democratic politics in pursuit of increasingly esoteric, scientific approaches to studying poli-

tical phenomena. Similarly, government agents are accused of insulating themselves from democratic accountability. In both cases, the common complaint rests upon the idea that bureaucrats have become supremely loyal to their professions and the organizations in which they work. This professional loyalty, in turn, has come at the expense of loyalty to the polis.

The rise of the modern academic bureaucracy began in tandem with nationwide efforts to professionalize government and business production and service delivery processes. These efforts sought to replace patronage and nepotism with the twin goals of efficiency and neutral competence under the banner of Progressive Era reform. At each level of government, Progressive Era reformers were largely successful. At the federal level, the Pendleton Act of 1883 introduced the civil service or merit system of employment and advancement. By 1905, over 50% of federal government employees were covered by the merit system. At the local level, the council-manager form of government and the introduction of municipal budgeting served to enhance government accountability (Kahn 1997). Simultaneously, the scientific management movement transformed business administration by advocating the "one best way" to maximize efficiency in the performance of a given task (Taylor 1911). Soon thereafter, public administration scholars applied the prescriptions of scientific management to goods production and service delivery in the public sector (Gulick 1937).

Thus, bureaucratic professionalism and specialization became institutionalized in the private and public sectors. Academia, with its manifold disciplines, seemed all too suitable to these trends. Consequently, as Ricci (1984) explains, political science underwent a fundamental shift in its *raison d'être*. In this process, the rich contextual descriptions of political history and the great questions of political philosophy were largely ignored as political science sought its rightful place as a *de facto* science.

The consequences of this shift, as Ricci explains, included: (1) changes in political science curricula at colleges and universities, (2) organizational restructuring of political science departments, and (3) shifting of career expectations of political scientists. The discipline became enamored with the positivist mode of science, replete with its understanding of methodology aimed at finding a paradigm. Students and professors began to devote considerable attention to study-

ing and applying such methodology. Scholarly journals were created to display peer-reviewed articles consisting of empirical research. These journals became the gateways to professional legitimacy, peer respect, and tenure as a university faculty member. Here, the scientific management notion of efficiency surfaced in a scholar's ability to rapidly publish empirical analyses of political phenomena (Ricci 1984). The discipline was pushed more deeply into positivism with the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, wherein formal modeling and advanced statistical analyses of quantitative data became the standard modes of political inquiry.

As Harmon (1981) explains, three dominant schools of thought appeared in political science: (1) Skinnerian behaviorism, which focused only on an individual political actor's conditioned response to a stimulus; (2) social behaviorism, which focused on an individual's passive reaction to other actors; and (3) rational choice, which focused on an individual's drive to maximize her utility. While each of these schools held differing views of an individual's actions, each co-existed with the other two out of deference for their common positivist orientation and quantitative methodology. Moreover, the behavioral revolution further marginalized previous modes of political science scholarship such as political history, political biography, and political philosophy (Ricci 1984).

Consequently, the behavioral revolution served to insulate political scientists from the public at large. The rigorous quantitative analyses and esoteric jargon of journal articles became largely inaccessible to the average citizen, whose methodological training and discipline-specific vocabulary were limited. Only a few political scientists persisted in writing pieces for popular press outlets (Cohn 1999). Thus, the post-behavioral revolution practice of political science scholarship seems to have neglected the "commitment to democratic politics" that was once among the discipline's chief objectives (Ricci 1984, pp. 23-24).

Public administration scholars have drawn eerily similar conclusions regarding post-Progressive Era bureaucratic operations. Just as academic scholars adapted to these reforms, public administrators began to concentrate on becoming professionally competent. The route toward such competence was prescribed by scholars in the "principles" school who, "follow-

ing the tradition of the scientific revolution... suggested that the practice of administration could be reduced to lessons and taught to newcomers" (Shafritz et al. 2004, p. ix). The prerequisite for traveling this route, scholars agreed, was embodied in the politics-administration dichotomy.

The dichotomy, simply stated, encouraged public administrators to minimize the role of democratic politics in public administration. The dichotomy was guided by a normative argument borne out of Progressive Era reform: if not separated from politics, public agencies would be staffed with incompetent party hacks, and this would result in inefficient and dishonest administrative practices (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900; Eaton 1880). Considering the political climate that brought about Progressive reform, especially the patronage-related death of President Garfield (and, perhaps, President Harrison as well) a reader can understand how readily the dichotomy was accepted in the scholarly community (Kahn 1997).

Once the normative argument of the dichotomy was sold, scholars followed Woodrow Wilson's call for public agencies to adopt strategies that had recently developed in the private sector. Fred Taylor, the most renowned of these scholars, began to study management through a positivist lens. Taylor's goal was to maximize efficiency in production through a series of time-motion studies (Taylor 1911). Building off of Taylor's work, Luther Gulick (1937) advocated for division of labor via task specialization, coordination of labor, and systematic organization. Gulick's principles are embodied in one acronym, POSDCORB, which explains the functions of the executive as: (1) planning, (2) organizing, (3) staffing, (4) directing, (5) coordinating, (6) reporting, and (7) budgeting (1937, p. 97).

As the reader can see, none of these early public administration scholars looked beyond the formal bureaucratic organization. Introspection became the coin of the realm in public organizations. If an agency's service delivery was inefficient, these authors would chastise the agency's managers for their failure to implement their principles. Furthermore, these principles were believed to be universal. That is, every agency in every field of public administration everywhere around the world was expected to apply the tenets of the dichotomy, scientific management, and POSDCORB. Thus, contextual factors, including form of government, were largely ignored.

Woodrow Wilson himself suggested that administration in the United States should have emulated the cunning efficiency of Prussia's 19th Century bureaucracy, despite the fact that such efficiency resulted from Prussia's brutally autocratic regime, replete with vestiges of the feudal system that had long been dead in other Western nations. Here, Wilson explains, the United States "borrowed rice [from China], but we do not eat it with chopsticks" (1887, p. 219). In another passage, Wilson (1887, p. 220) makes an even more appropriate analogy, saying:

"If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his."

With this statement, Wilson feels completely justified in articulating his desire for the United States' federal bureaucracy to act as a business guided by a science of administration in much the same way that political science departments began to pursue a science of politics comparable to chemistry, physics, and biology. As these two examples demonstrate, our nation had been gripped by an overwhelming passion for professionalization fueled by science. Ever since, however, there have been academics, bureaucrats, and others who have questioned whether a professional administrator could "borrow" methods from another when the two administrators operate in fundamentally different environments (e.g., in this instance, autocracy vs. democracy).

One of the earliest critics, Robert Merton (1940), argued that the danger of bureaucratic organization stemmed from such an inward focus on perpetuating organizational norms, especially the formal rules and procedures commonly written into the organization's SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). As an organization ages, Merton argued, these rules begin to take on lives of their own. Thus, over time, the organization may lose sight of its overall mission and goals at the expense of members' commitment to the SOP. Merton calls this phenomenon "goal displacement."

Similarly, Anthony Downs (1967) explains that

bureaucracies lose their zealous concern for making a difference in the social world (e.g., by addressing or ameliorating social problems) over time because organizational “zealots” become frustrated with red tape and the incremental nature of policy-making and abandon the organization, leaving only the organizational “conservers.” Downs calls this phenomenon the “law of increasing conservatism.” These conservers, rather than desiring to radically alter some aspect of their policy arena, only wish to maintain the organizational status quo. Thus, they are perfectly content with incremental policy processes and budget allocations.

Additional complaints about government bureaucracies include: (1) agencies, through structural arrangements and relationships with a select few groups and actors, buffer themselves from accountability to citizen pressures and desires (Thompson 1967; Adams 1982; Hecl 1978); (2) agencies are slow, if at all willing, to change their processes in order to become responsive to their service clientele (Downs 1967); (3) agencies and their employees are self-serving utility maximizers, often subordinating the betterment of the public to their own advancement (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971; Tullock 1965), and sometimes “strategically misrepresenting” their budget needs, as well as the scope and effectiveness of their programmatic operations (Jones and Euske 1991); and (4) bureaucrats often sacrifice competent and efficient service delivery at the altar of their policy preferences (Svara 1998).

Thus, when Ricci explains the divisions, subdivisions, and factions that have developed in political science, he is asserting that these structures have effectively sealed political science from external accessibility. Exacerbating the dilemma wrought by these structural walls, Ricci claims, the “Temple of Science” is further secured with the twin combination locks of methodological sophistication and technical jargon. The “publish or perish” model of career advancement then forces many scholars to subordinate popular dissemination of their studies to publication in narrowly-focused professional journals (see also Cohn 1999). Consequently, Ricci says, modern political science scholarship has become an exercise in groupthink, rife with academic masturbation to the images of a preferred school of thought. Thus, Ricci says, academicians are merely accountable to like-minded peer reviewers of their work, which is largely irrelevant to other

groups of scholars and members of society at large.

In his attack, Ricci specifically targets methodological positivists who have branded themselves with the irons of behaviorism. Behaviorists, Ricci claims, have emphasized quantity over quality (both in terms of the number of publications they pump out and in their chosen methodologies) and have ignored the historical context of the political phenomena that they study. The amalgamation of these decisions has resulted in political science’s *hamartia*. In order to save the discipline from the triumvirate ills of bureaucratic specialization, behavioral myopia, and scientific inaccessibility, Ricci offers some creative advice for political scientists.

Ricci’s Flawed Prescriptions

While Ricci identifies critical issues in the discipline, the solutions that he proposes are flawed. Among his suggestions, Ricci advises students to actively deceive their professors by pretending to subscribe to the behavioral paradigm while secretly rejecting its tenets. Thus, these students may advance professionally to become tenured faculty members before they take the risk of revealing their covert views of the discipline. Upon reading this sagacious advice, several red flags jumped from the text. First, how practical is it for a student to feign adherence to an epistemology that she despises? After all, this ostensible conformity would have to be presented in class discussions, examination responses, term papers, conference activities, and peer-reviewed publications.

The stress and cognitive dissonance that would result from such an arduous facade, it seems, would drain the motivational reservoir of all but the most determined students. Thus, once she “came out of the closet,” a student might lack any drive to promote her preferred worldview. Additionally, how would one retain legitimacy as a scholar if she chose to reveal that everything she had said and/or done before was rooted in pretense? It seems that she, post-revelation, would be as well-received by like-minded peers as Saul of Tarsus was initially greeted by the Christians he once persecuted when he returned from his encounter on the road to Damascus.

Finally, how would a student avoid being co-opted by progenitors of the dominant paradigm? If victims can fall prey to “Stockholm syndrome”

during the traumatic course of being held captive by terrorists, it seems that university students could similarly begin to believe their relatively more amiable professors with the insidious repetition of one worldview. Simply stated, it seems that repetitive hearing, speaking, and writing from one perspective would influence a person to subscribe to this perspective. Even if a student possessed the extraordinary willpower to deflect the dominant paradigm's influence, the secrecy and shame that come along with hiding her true beliefs might diminish the confidence that she placed in these alternate beliefs and/or her self-efficacy in relating these beliefs once she has attained professional security.

From an ethical standpoint, it seems that the deceptive student is not only harming herself. Additionally, she is harming her classmates and her professors by hoarding what she perceives to be the superior perspective. Thus, in an ironic act of rational self-interest, the student prevents these others from becoming similarly enlightened. Yet another irony surfaces in this lack of transparency; it indirectly serves to perpetuate the dominant paradigm. Edmund Burke's assertion that "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing" seems especially applicable to the deception-based route. Finally, how can a student mature intellectually if her "real" perspectives, thoughts, and conclusions are never challenged? How can a student be certain that her conclusions are the correct ones when they cannot be tested? While Ricci's teleological rationale justifies the route of deception as a noble path, we are forced to conclude that this path is one marked with cowardice and laziness.

Alternatives to Ricci I: Broad Acceptance of Multiple Research Approaches

While Ricci describes several flaws of modern political science, his remedies seem even less democratic than the present problems. Instead of the deception and devolution to studying "great books," which Ricci advocates at the expense of empirically-based scholarship, we propose more practical and healthier remedies. Just as there is no true dichotomy between politics and administration, there is no dichotomy between the view of science as a progressive accumulation of knowledge and the view of science as a series of multifaceted, yet complementary, methodological endeavors or a cyclical paradigm war.

The replacement of major pieces of a dominant paradigm does not always invalidate all previous scholarship in a discipline. For instance, the advent of Darwinian evolution did not force zoologists to discard the binomial nomenclature used in the taxonomy of animals. Nor did the invention of the internal-combustion engine signal the defeat of all locomotive technology that existed beforehand (e.g., the wheel).

As with most tragedies, the real tragic flaw of political science is embodied in the collective pride of each subset of scholars that precludes them from cooperating with one another to investigate political phenomena. Inquiry in the discipline could be improved with triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, each complementing flaws in the other (Silverman 2001; Mathison 1988). Furthermore, Ricci makes an excellent point regarding the importance of incorporating historical context into modern scholarship. This point has subsequently been echoed by a variety of political scientists (e.g., Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1995). Finally, interdisciplinary scholarship between social scientists of all stripes and natural scientists may result in a more productive and relevant series of studies. The answer, then, is not to lose faith in science altogether. Instead, scholars should strive to improve their methods of inquiry and consider disparate epistemological lines of reasoning. This prescription is not to be confused with Edward Wilson's (1998) radical reduction of all disciplines to physics and biochemistry. Indeed, as is the case with human diversity, there is much to be said for the unique perspectives and methods that each discipline (or subfield) offers. While disciplinary integrity, to me, is non-negotiable, methodological cross-fertilization is imperative.

Alternatives to Ricci II: Forging Reciprocal Links with Citizens

One possible outcome of the methodological triangulation mentioned above is the creation of discourse among political scientists from different traditions. This, alone, will not reinvigorate the discipline's commitment to democracy. However, opening lines of communication between faculty members serves as an initial step toward broader communication between scholars and citizens.

Many exogenous forces are hastening such broad communication between bureaucrats and their clientele. Most notably, the Information

Revolution, as well as FOIA and EFOIA, have altered the dynamics of information exchange, resulting in citizen empowerment through the widespread availability of knowledge. Thus, the role of the professional bureaucrat (academic or otherwise) is rapidly changing from the model of an information gatekeeper to a source of interpretation for widespread data. As a result, centralized technocratic authority is giving way to fragmentation, interdependence, and shared powers (Paquet 2005; Wright 2000). The bureaucrat must simultaneously recognize the equality of citizens in her service community and take on a leadership role in providing and interpreting information (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; Frederickson 1996; Denhardt 2002).

In the realm of public administration, this leadership role could be realized through more frequent interactions with clientele, thereby increasing opportunities for citizen participation. While participation efforts may not yield immediate victories for citizens in government processes, these efforts may serve to enhance communication and trust between government officials and citizens (Cole 1975; Adams 2004), leading to reinvigorated levels of popular participation. Such efforts may also serve the long-term goal of “enhancing governmental accountability and responsiveness” (Adams 2004, p. 43) because public officials may begin to attribute more importance to citizen input. Finally, government officials may also consider augmenting the range of participatory activities that they encourage because citizen satisfaction with a government system “increases as citizens participate in that system” (Baer and Jaros 1974, p. 365; Weeks 2000; United Nations Development Programme 2007). Similarly, political scientists should strive to hold more community-oriented discussions and presentations of research. Perhaps by articulating their findings in a manner that is relatively easy for citizens to understand, political scientists can rekindle citizen interest in the discipline (e.g., in a community forum, in popular media, etc.).

The bureaucrat or the political scientist, in taking on this leadership role, might eventually forge meaningful, symbiotic relationships with citizens. These relationships will lay the foundation for the cultivation of trust between citizens and professional bureaucrats, ultimately leading to enhanced efficacy and empowerment among citizens. With this newfound efficacy, citizens may

find it easier to participate in bureaucratic and academic activities, whether they choose to attend a budget meeting, a regulatory court hearing, or an academic conference (Alford and Friedland 1975).

Public Administration as a Lodestar

Jonathan Cohn of *The New Republic* (1999, p. 5) poses a central question to the field of political science: “whether political scientists have an obligation to do work that is not merely interesting as an intellectual enterprise but also helps us govern ourselves. Of all the “subfields” of political science, public administration may be in the best position to reconnect with government and citizens. Ever since criticisms against the principles school began to accumulate, scholars in PA have been forced to answer one question in defense of their work: “SO WHAT?” The “So What?” question, in its more elaborate form asks, “How does this inform practice *in the real world?*” PA’s commitment to this question is more than mere lip service, as evidenced by the fact that every article in *Public Administration Review*, the flagship journal of PA, is reviewed by at least one practitioner (i.e., one public manager). Considering this link, it seems natural that PA scholarship can be more easily translated into meaningful, albeit simplified and truncated, knowledge for everyday citizens than might be the case for scholarly works appearing in *The American Political Science Review*. In this way, Meier (2007, p. 1) asserts that political science “could learn from public administration.” Here, giving the John Gaus Lecture to a room full of public administrationists, Meier (2007, p. 8) explains that public administration scholars should share their methods, theories, and practical orientation with political scientists:

“I know that when delivering the Gaus Lecture I am preaching to the choir. I also know that you find your own research more exciting and interesting than what political scientists do. But let me suggest that missionary work is a valuable contribution. I urge you to visit political scientists in their native habitats and bring them the word. There was once a vital and flourishing joint tradition of public administration and political science. That tradition can only be recreated if those in public administration carry the torch. With the publication in PS, there remains the possibility that some political scientists not in

public administration might read the lecture. Those scholars I would encourage to check out the public administration literature..."

Learning as a Duty of Citizenship

Heretofore, we have placed a great deal of emphasis on the bureaucrat's or the academician's role in fostering citizen communication, trust, and participation. Citizens, though, share a great deal of responsibility for closing the gap between political science and democracy. If the fall of classical organizational theory has taught us anything, it has demonstrated that human beings are not automatons to be programmed by authoritarian leaders (McGregor 1960). Instead, citizens must work equally hard to develop an understanding of political science's relevance to their lives.

Since the publication of *The American Voter* (and probably before), the average American's minimal awareness of the political realm has been a source of frustration to academics and citizens who champion citizen participation (Campbell et al. 1960). Citizen ignorance and apathy are often chalked up to a host of factors, including: (1) a lack of efficacy or empowerment (Alford and Friedland 1975) in a political system controlled by elites (Mills 1956; Schnattschneider 1960; Michels 1911), (2) the costs of obtaining information (Downs 1957), especially in low-information elections (Schaffner and Streb 2002), and (3) the aforementioned disciplinary jargon of political science articles and books. While these factors, no doubt, limit citizen participation for many Americans, they certainly fail to explain the entire problem. The "lead a horse to water" cliché comes to mind. Barber's (1984) notion of "strong democracy" helps to explain the duty that citizens have to be active (and knowledgeable) in political processes. Here, Barber explains, (1984, p. 241) three types of leadership [from the academic and bureaucratic communities] are needed:

"[T]ransitional leadership on the model of the founder[s]; facilitating leadership as a foil for natural hierarchy [e.g., the Iron Law of Oligarchy] and as a guarantor of participatory institutions; and moral leadership as a source of community."

Even if one places a great deal of blame on the technocratic nature of modern political science, she cannot deny that "strong democracy" is necessary if political science is ever to become relevant to citizens. For instance, a town

hall meeting designed to present research results in a culturally appropriate fashion is pointless if it takes place in an empty room. Similarly, a political scientist's publication in a popular periodical is equally fruitless if it is ignored. Thus, the discipline's commitment to democracy can only be as strong as the people's commitment. In short; specialized knowledge, though often considered the sole culprit, is but one independent variable in a cyclically causal relationship.

RECOMMENDATIONS

If "So What?" is the question that we should be asking ourselves with regard to our research topics, then "Now What?" is the question we address here. That is, how do we as political scientists connect our work to the public, and where do we go from there? There are numerous ways that academics can forge linkages to the citizenry and fulfill the role of public intellectuals. The following recommendations focus on aspects relating to research and scholarship.

Hillygus (2005) finds that exposure to the social sciences as an undergraduate influences future political engagement. This finding suggests that social scientists should make earnest gestures to take social science theories and ideas outside of the classroom so that they are available to those who never attend a college or university. In order to transmit the findings of social science research to the public, there must be venues for interaction between political scientists and the public. One such option would be low cost or free lectures or discussions that are targeted at the general public. This is important because Kweit and Kweit (1980) assert that there is a participation gap between wealthy and non-wealthy citizens. Presumably, social scientists can help to minimize the participation gap by making low-cost or free information available to citizens, regardless of socioeconomic status. Within the university setting this is something that could easily be imagined. The key elements would be twofold: presenting the content in a manner that is directed to the general public, and getting the public to attend.

Another such venue that focuses more on the linkages between our discipline and government is to hold collaborative group meetings to discuss program implementation and evaluation, paying special attention to performance standards. Ho and Coates (2004, p. 29) describe a

model of collaboration in practice in nine Iowa cities “in which citizens, elected officials, and city staff collaborate to develop performance measures.” Not only should such models be more deeply considered at the local level, but university professors should also take advantage of the opportunities these group processes offer for them to attempt to apply theory to practice. The mere act of creating a discussion might have several benefits, according to Klofstad (2007), who argues that political discussion serves as a source of recruitment for political participation. If social scientists organize town hall discussions, or even public lectures, this might enhance opportunities for discussion. These discussions, then, might serve the function of helping citizens to become more actively engaged in the work of organizations that recruit them.

One traditional outlet for public intellectuals has been through the print media, primarily newspapers. This tradition should be extended to include newspaper columns written by social scientists to summarize the most recent findings in the field in easily comprehensible language. The overall goal is to re-engage the professoriate, as well as the citizenry, in the real world of politics and the duties of citizenship (as opposed to obscure quantitative research and widespread apathy, respectively). This, in turn, will help to facilitate the formation of what Putnam (2000) calls, “bridging social capital.” Bridging social capital comes about when diverse groups interact with one another to build reciprocal trust and work toward mutual goals. Nowhere is the potential for bridging social capital so evident as on the Internet, which might also be a forum for reconnecting academics, citizens, and public administrators. Best and Krueger (2005, p. 183) suggest that the internet has the potential for representing some of the public’s policy preferences. Social scientists should take advantage of the internet to educate and inform citizens regarding key issues, rights, and duties.

Yang and Callahan (2007) contend that bureaucratic responsiveness plays a role in increasing citizen participation. By following our proposed solutions, social scientists can increase bureaucratic responsiveness by arming citizens with information needed to construct requests and questions to offer bureaucrats.

We heartily recommend academics take action oriented toward the prescriptions offered in this paper in order to explore whether these behaviors

will forge greater linkages between citizens and social scientists and result in more citizen interest in social science scholarship. We also recommend citizens begin to consider the duty they have to themselves and society at large to become engaged and attuned to social science inquiry.

CONCLUSION

The common roots of technical specialization in academia and public organizational theory provide a basis for offering similar remedies to each. Rather than attempting the radical strategies that Ricci proposes, two other strategies seem more feasible: triangulating methodology to enhance bonding social capital between groups of academicians and practitioners, respectively, and enhancing citizen participation opportunities to increase bridging social capital between academicians, bureaucrats, and citizens (Putnam 2000). While their commitments to democracy might not change overnight, these mechanisms might gradually alter the goals of bureaucratic agents and political scientists toward this end. This, in turn, can open lines of future communication and provide a legitimate base of social power for these actors that might serve to complement (though not replace) the expertise-based power they have accumulated since the Progressive Era. Finally, citizens have an equal duty in making political science relevant, salient, and useful to themselves. Because “[c]ivic engagement encourages participation in [certain] political activities, which in turn contributes to electoral participation” (Wagle 2006, p. 301), academics must do their part to help engage the citizenry in public affairs.

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