Contesting "Good Governance" in Nigeria: Legitimacy and Accountability Perspectives

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ABSTRACT Close observations of governance in Nigeria have revealed a poor attempt at democratic consolidation and a stable politics. The studies have shown abysmal performance of public office holders in their quest to provide good governance and better living condition for the generality of the people. The system had experienced from them a battered economy, impoverishment of larger numbers of people, corruption and mismanagement of public funds infrastructure decay and a lot more others, hence they lack every iota of acceptability from the governed and invariably suffer legitimacy crisis. People's expectations of dividends and good life had been dashed on the altar of ineptitude, greed and lack of dignity. It is therefore pertinent to call attention of stakeholders to these malaise and attempt measures for revival of good governance and its attendant democratic consolidation.

INTRODUCTION

For well over two decades, the notion of good governance, that democratic consolidation requires, has served as a general guiding principle for newly established democracies that they adhere to proper administrative procedures, institutionalize reform, transparency, accountability and popular participation. It is unmis-takably clear that the concept of good governance could invite judgment about how a particular country, city or agency was being governed or should be governed, with a view to showing the relationship between the state and civil society, and how to establish the ideal balance between them, in order to achieving a stable political system that encourages consolidation of democracy.

In fact having a reminiscent of the interval since the launch of the good governance discourse in politics, it is striking to see how quickly the term became a household word, heading the list of concerns of government researchers, public commentators and the media. As is often true with new buzzwords, there has hardly been a consensus as to its core meaning, and how it could be applied concretely, still, it has gained a key function by virtue of its capacity all at once to draw attention to a whole range of often largely unspecified issues concerning processes of public policy-making and authority structures. To this extent, it has appealed to the imagination of analysts as well as practitioners, and become a focal point for intellectual and policy discourses.

However, despite the attraction that the notion of good governance has had both in scope and potential coverage in the global policy-making perspective, it has not meant much to the stakeholders in the Nigerian political scene. To the extent that efforts by both the state and the civil society to institute -using legitimacy and accountability as the basic features of good governance- a democratic governance and eventual consolidation, even since the enthronement of the nascent democracy has been arduous, and almost seem unrealizable. Suffice to say that this paper will attempt an appraisal of the regime performance and ineptitude index, using the instrument of good governance, especially legitimacy and accountability.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

The term good governance has for a long time had a somewhat obscure dictionary existence, it points to a general area of common interest that hardly carries a specific meaning in the political science discipline. Like other concepts in its categories, its intrinsic open-ended quality, vagueness, and inherent lack of specificity have tended to generate a good deal of searching and debate as to what its proper meaning is or should be, prompting multiple efforts to appropriate it and define it in particular ways.

For Bankers, for example, financial account-ability might represent the crux of good gover-nance, while ordinary villagers and citizens in various countries might stress the maintenance of security as their prime criterion. The lack of

specificity is not particularly surprising: a pliable term like governance, rather than constituting a concept in its own right, is a flexible carrier that can be used to convey varying combinations of messages or consignments, though largely remaining within the same general specialization. Thus, there has come to be a fair amount of oscillation in its usage, some of it more policy-oriented and some more academic.

However, we should acknowledge the fact that a substantial body of literature has develop in the academic stream concerning the development of a better understanding of different ways in which power and authority relations are structured in different context, focusing on different modes of interpenetration of state-civil society relations, which good governance represented, even despite its ambiguity. Suffice to say that academic discourse in this regard has been primarily oriented towards better analysis and understanding of the institutional linkages between the state and society in different context.

Therefore, if governance is generally referred to the means for achieving directions, control and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organizations on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute (Lynn et al. 2000), then, good governance in the words of Healey and Robinson (1994), implies "a high level of organizational effectiveness in relation to policy formulation and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy and its contribution to growth, stability and public welfare". More explicitly, it is "the means by which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank 1992), which Potter calls "sound development management" (2000: 379). That is a broad sphere of public sector management; accountability; legal framework for development (reforms); information and technology; the legitimacy of government; the competence of governments to formulate appropriate policies; make timely decision; implement them effectively and deliver services. She continues also to link good governance to the extent which a government is perceived and accepted as legitimate, committed to improving the public welfare and responsive to the needs of its citizens, competent to assure law and order, and deliver public services, able to create an enabling public environment for productive activities and equitable in its conduct (Potter 2000; Simbine 2000).

LEGITIMACY PERSPECTIVE

Legitimacy has been a constant problem of the various governments, both military and civilian, in Nigeria since independence. Though, whatever we may consider as the meaning of legitimacy or however controversial and conflicting, the concept may be in political lexicon, its meaning and intent is not ambiguous, because it continues to be relevant in determining acceptability and popularity of a regime. In a nutshell, the people that make up a particular state can generally describe it as the level of acceptability of a government. That is, it refers to a situation which is significantly based on the recognition that the occupier of a political seat is acting on the consent of the governed, to the extent that citizens regard the state, the institution, personnel or policies as morally right or acceptable (Robertson 1985; Bogdamor 1991; Tansey 1995). Though, the concept of legitimacy is commonly applied to the manner in which a government, ruler or office holder has assumed office. The tenure of his office is regarded legitimate, if the individual has attained office by procedure, which to those he governs may consider it compatible with the configuration of their own values. His tenure, scholars say, is legitimate because of the way he obtains it not because of what he does. If a political decision is made, the citizens will comply with and support such decision that they regard as their own.

But, in some other cases, legitimacy is accorded to a ruler whose actions have a positive impact on people's lives. This means, if the establishment's rules and procedures are repeatedly violated on a large scale or if the government engages in blatant act of illegality and deception, it may lose its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the majority, the method of ascension to power notwith-standing. Legitimacy, therefore in this case, deals with what actually happens in politics and not just with the procedure by which political power is obtained or the representation through which it exercises its power. People feel that government is just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate not only by how it came to power, but more importantly, by what it does.

If government's actions, inactions or omissions violate the people's basic values, they may conclude as St. Augustine did in his book title *The City of God* that: "a government without justice is a great robbery" (cf. Kopstein and Lichbach 2000: 11). Therefore, a government is said to be legitimate if the people to whom its

orders are directed believe that the structures, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials or leaders possess the quality of rightness to make good laws and ensure good governance.

Without doubt however, the problem of democracy and its subsequent attempt at consolidation anywhere in the world requires a certain degree of state – societal trust of legitimation (either procedural or performance) to gain firm ground, even in the ancient city state of Greece and among contemporary prophets of democracy (the US and Britain): They have all passed through such turbulent periods of state-societal legitimation in their democratization processes because the survival and development of states are traced to efforts at reducing or removing the turbulence. Therefore, Nigerian democracy has been seen to be problematic in this case due to two fundamental issues of legitimacy. Firstly, there is the incompatibility of the western (liberal) democratic system to the Nigerian political landscape due to its structural and historical social formations like those of most African countries.

Though, there is a general agreement in most African countries as in other parts of the world that an enthronement of democracy is the most prevalent game in their political discourse, not only because it elicits high hopes and offers better opportunities for self-actualization and development, but also because it represents the fulcrum in the values which the global wind of change has impose on the global system (Fatton 1990). It has however been realized that the underlying persistence of the West's inclinations to engage in democracy promotion and good governance in the third world nations (Nigeria inclusive) is based more on economic and political rationales than on true devotion to democracy. Despite efforts by western nations to conceal ulterior motives, their deeds (or lack thereof) often give the lie to their intentions.

Although official western rhetoric seems to suggest a goal of improving conditions in third world countries by striking some sort of balance between individual rights and the responsibilities of the state, the reality is baffling at best. There are grounds to doubt the sincerity of western countries that claim to want to promote good governance, aid the growth of democracy, and thereby promote economic growth, social progress and combat poverty. What matters to the western powers in the developing nations is

not democracy and its potential virtues, but the policy goal of making them politically more stable, economically more secure, and safer for financial investment.

In the word of Lynder Chalker, (cf. Cox 2000: 9) the Tory British Minister of Overseas Development from 1989 to 1997:

(Good governance) is not neo-colonialist or neo-imperialist. (it) cannot be imposed on developing countries, but their efforts can be sustained and helped effectively only through a just and democratic system of good governance, in a world, which interests are served by a healthy global economy and open trading environment. (Emphasis mine)

Therefore, the "divine mandate" to democratize the third world countries has a troubling resemblance with the colonialism of the nineteenth centuries. According to Georg Sovensen (2000: 287) "western countries pursue their own agenda, irrespective of broader consequences for democracy"

Secondly, this lack of sincerity from the proponents or advocates of democracy and good governance has led to its level of inaction and ineptitude in its practice in Nigeria, especially in the mode or procedure of ascension to power. The practices of the so-called democratic states (both developed and developing) call into question the sincerity of their commitment to democracy and good governance. Faith in the new gospel of democracy seems to depend upon what is at stake and on the importance and the loyalty of the player. Hence, the structures and associated frameworks introduced by the system are seen to be entirely alien and at variance with the known African democratic governance (Whitaker 1970; Basil 1992).

A number of instances of structural mismatch and unconventional practices are required to discuss the contradictions that exist between the modern liberal democracy and the indigenous political systems in Africa. For instance, in the traditional African political culture, political authority is derived from rural community, which Uya (1987: 39) defined as "the widest grouping within which there is a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes" (see also, Pye 1958; Lijphart 1977). In this rural community, there is much emphasis on *collectivity*, respect for culture, language and ethnic or group concerns even in the distribution of available resources.

To Africans the political sphere is not clearly

differentiated from the sphere of social and personal relations, more importantly in the distribution of available scarce resources. The fundamental framework of politics especially, is a *communal* one, and all political behaviour is strongly coloured by consideration of *communal* identification. Hence, collectivity and together-ness play a pivotal role in governance and social security.

Whereas western idea of democracy as epitomized in liberal democratic style is specifically rooted in the notion of political and social rights for *individuals,* which eventually brewed greed, avarice and self-centredness. Therefore, social justice and freedom in the contemporary African world with liberal democratic practice can only bring alienation, in cohesion and instability into the political system unless there is a conscious effort to adapt the practice to local realities, and its contours are shaped by indigenous African socio-cultural tradition.

Secondly, though, democracy is more than just the right to cast a ballot every few years. Democracy in its real essence requires not only that people have the right to elect their own representatives as discussed earlier but also that their representatives reflect their views and desires when in government. In situations where the political representatives willfully defy the will of the people, the people ought to have the right to replace such deviant representatives. The right to immediate recall of wayward representatives ought to be an essential feature of any real democracy: either the political representatives should change their policies to reflect public will or else they must resign or be forced out of office as it was in the Old Oyo Empire, where checks and balances allowed an erring leader to commit suicide. This is not evidenced in the liberal democratic reform as people only have the right to effect a change on unpopular government only at the period of election, which comes up after expiration of a governmental term of four to five years.

Thirdly, if democracy, according to Tandon (1979: 1), concerns the lives of people in their daily struggle for material existence, or what Shivji (2001) calls "popular livelihoods", involving relations with production, especially property relations, the ownership and control of the productive forces and the means of livelihood. The approach at its enthronement must be culturally sensitive. In this sense, we cannot adopt democratization by just transposing it from the west and expect it to work: it needs a lot of

adaptations, and we need to return to the old consultative approach within the pre-colonial communities. There should be traditional and indigenous regional or sub-regional mechanisms that monitor the behaviour of states and actually set up "peer reviews" – using traditional institutions (Obas, traditional rulers, Ogbonis etc.), regionalism to reinforce state-building projects (Greenberg 2003).

Rather than projecting for an enduring state-building capacity that ensures development, what we experience in Africa is a wrong approach to a right issue. Colonization has succeeded largely in destroying or bastardizing distinct institutions; the people lost their grip of control on their rulers. The emergent ruling elites to practice the imposed democracy were alienated, especially by education from the people. The elites therefore because of their common front of exploitation and patron-clientele instinct easily coalesced to subjugate the people's sovereignty. Politics to them became an economic instrument to corner and rubbish people's freedom; values lost their sanctities and institutions were used to create iniquity. A new political culture prevalent under western democracy thereafter emerged. Basil (1992: 223) was quick to describe what the western powers did to Africa:

…destroy or downgrade Africa's institutions and culture which had taught how to provide forms of republic control over executives… in short, form of democratic behaviour which had given Africa's peoples a confident sense of possessing and exercising a real control over their own lives. The institution of that past sovereignty could not be restored. The cultures, which had produced them… were lacking in self-belief. What remained possible now could only be difficult experiment or renewed subjection.

The situation seems a corroboration of the pervasiveness of "virtual democracy", which according to Joseph (1998: 34) "is distinguished by the illusory nature of its democratic institutions and practices, and the fact that they are deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of presentability" (see also Obasanjo 1989: 4). For this reason, attention was not paid to indigenous or local peculiarities and realities. The external promotion of such democracy, especially in Nigeria, therefore promotes a kind of democracy whose relevance is problematic at best and at worst prone to engender contradictions that tend to derail or

trivialize democratization and its consolidation in the country speaking against this background, Ake (2001: 130) opined that:

Liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision-making power. The essence of liberal democracy is precisely the abolition of popular power and the replacement of popular sovereignty with the rule of law. As it evolved, liberal democracy got less democracy as its democratic elements, such as the consent of the governed, and popular participation, came under pressure from political elites…

But on the contrary, a system is said to be democratic in the African context when it reflects the interests and aspirations of the working majority; respects human rights; promotes growth and development, and creates an environment which will enable indigenes to attain the highest point of their creative abilities. According to Ihonvbere (1994):

It is this level of creating commitment, patriotism and participation that will make it possible for science and technology to be taken seriously, attract investors, encourage investment in production, and define limits for state participation in the economy, check corruption and political excess.

Without these in place, a government which does not enjoy the support and acceptance of the people is illegitimate and the possibility of consolidation a mirage.

ACCOUNTABILITY PERSPECTIVE

Though, the polity transited from military autocracy and absolutism to an electoral democracy (the assessment of the transition notwithstanding), but efforts at consolidating this hard-won democracy becomes a tall dream, not only as a result of legitimacy crisis but also for the fact that the material gains of democracy has not really made much impact on the standard of living of an average Nigerian at least beyond mere *fabian rhetorics* by politicians, even after seven years of democratic experiment.

It should be noted that, for the citizens to have a sense of obligation to the state, there must be a rational relationship between the citizens and the state. Some theories of obligation take as a basic requirement of the relationship between the citizens and the state, the *recognition* and *acceptance* of such relationship on the part of the citizens (Tansey 1995: 107-128). This means that citizens are not an unwilling element, but a conscious and voluntary partner in such a relationship. Thus, for citizens to demonstrate support for the government, the state must have been seen to play its part. This is because; citizens that are not taken care of can never be expected to be obedient to the state. Political obligation therefore is a function of the extent to which the state can better the lots of her citizens. To be patriotic is for the state to have played its own part too. As rightly put by Laski (1982: 82):

… a state, which refuses one, the thing it declares essential to the well being of another is making one less a citizen. It is denying that which invests its power with moral authority. It is admitting that its claim upon one is built not upon its ethics, but its strength.

Laski, in the same work affirmed "a state must give to men their dues as men, before it can demand at least with justices, their loyalty".

Meanwhile, the noticeable thing from the performance of the Obasanjo-led administration of the fourth republic, which is the focus of our attention, is efforts to develop the state without being considerate of the interest of the people that make up the state. All reform agenda, economic policies and restructuring efforts of the government, especially its simultaneous transition (economic reform and political liberalization) is geared towards making name for the country especially in the international community without corresponding efforts at alleviating poverty, eradicating corruption and economic reforms that see to the well-being of the common man.

Researchers monitoring the political economy of Nigeria over the last few years of democratic rule can identify certain commonalties: the impoverishment of ever larger numbers of people and the declining material conditions of incipient middle classes; the permeating of public institutions by corrupt practices, institutional and infrastructural decay; and the circulation of major political institutions within a narrow set of elites (Joseph 2003: 163). So, if one views democratic consolidation efforts from the perspective of accountability, it would not be far from concluding that the effort is weak and unrealistic.

Meanwhile, Nigeria's democratic experiment turns five without the people reaping the dividends of economic policies. The economy, to say the least, is at the lowest ebb. The poverty alleviation programmes have also been

characterized by abysmal failure. The national currency, the naira has collapsed to unprecedented level; the media is replete with cries of the ordinary folks as a result of dramatic increase in the cost of living, as garri which used to be the cheapest food item is no more within the reach of the ordinary Nigerian. The energy sector has also been hit by unmitigated disaster resulting from acute shortage of petroleum products. Considering the level of inflation and other critical indices of economic performance, it can be safely concluded that the economy is in a worse state than the regime inherited it.

Whereas, at inception of the regime, the president in his inaugural address began not only by thanking the people for reposing confidence in him but also by identifying the inability of the nation to harness and manage its abundant resources to improve the quality of life of the people. He picked issues in the growing deterioration in the quality of governance, weakening of public institutions, citizens distrust in government, corruption, recklessness and the growing bitterness among various communities who were known to live in peace with each other due to either "actions or inactions" of government. There was also the virtual decay and collapse of infrastructure and social services pushing the nation into its "darkest period" leading to a situation of "chaos and despair". These were identified as the greatest challenges facing his government and he promised a "forthright, purposeful, committed, honest and transparent leadership" to tackle these problems and put a "halt to the decline in the human development indices".

 In fact, corruption, restoration of confidence in government, political reconciliation, crisis in the Niger Delta, professionalism in the army, harmony within the three arms of government were identified as key areas apart from the 17 priority issues dealing with, among which are food supply, law and order, education, job creation, exchange rate management, political and constitutional dialogue and resuscitations of the manufacturing industries.

But to the chagrin of Nigerians after seven years of democratic experiment, what is observable is an economy that is bedeviled by incessant bastardization; the political arena that is too volatile giving room to political killings, clashes of all cadre and injustice. This also had made the judiciary a toothless bulldog that cannot even bark out loud. The social life of citizenry is nil, unemployment, leading to hunger and

deprivation, disease and insecurity, as a result of which poverty has become the norm. And when you per chance take a cursory look at the nation's social activities, except of course for the ruling class who care less about the governed who are going through what many have referred to as a "hell of hard time", it is a shame (*National Pilot* Oct. 4-10, 2004: 16). Every facet of the polity had been ceded by selfishness, greed and acts of irresponsibility on the parts of the leaders.

Whereas, the ethical responsibility of leadership and the moral code embedded in the constitution they swore to uphold should imply that their mandate responsibility is the mandate they have to deliver on development, welfare and the provision of basic needs. The mandate stands to be subverted as long as the primary concern of the elected representatives is justification for looting public treasury and for searching for political enemies, both real and imagined. The ultimate challenge therefore, is for the citizenry and the electorates to mobilize against such political charlatans and demagogues, including their parties to ensure that they are not returned to power. The means through which this is done could be inimical to sustenance of democracy (Osaghae 2001).

President Abraham Lincoln of the United States famously defined democracy in his immortal Gettysburg address as "government of the people, by the people, for the people", but what we appear to be practicing in Nigeria is more like "government of the IMF, by the IMF, for the IMF". People who manage our economy obviously do not set so many stores by the Nigerian people, whence, the everyday push to satisfy the World Bank and the Brettonwoods institutions as opposed to the real needs of the citizens of this benighted nation. The so-called debt relief that was celebrated to high heavens by the authorities has since been exposed as a brazen scam to siphon off the $12 billion accruable to Nigeria via the oil windfall. Nigerians must perforce continue to hurt so that the foreign masters of our leaders can be appeased.

Thus, the reforms and projects introduced by the government to solve observable problems were seen to be alien and obnoxious. They were not in conformity with the expectations of the people; rather they were instituted to satisfy the interest of their foreign collaborators. To the people, the whole essence of democracy and its accruable dividends is to make food available on their table without resorting to criminal tendencies.

Unfortunately, the cost of living became unbearable for literally all families in the country, save those connected to the favoured network of the power elite. Everyday, people in government *parrot phrase* about embarking on reforms for the future benefits of Nigerians, (possibly for the immediate benefits of the foreign partners). The reality, however, is that as things are going now, most Nigerians would be dead before the dreamed benefits will start, if ever, to manifest.

The implication of these trends is worrisome and could be dangerous to any attempt to ensure political stability, talk less of consolidating democracy. The inference hence is that if urgent step is not taken by the government to "seriously" address the intractable burgeoning poverty in the country, and get accountable to the electorate we can hardly escape a future that is bursting with chaos and violence. Sometimes ago when James Wolfensohn, the World Bank president was in unmistakable terms warning against a future with chaos, violence and terror, he warned that drastic measures must be taken to alleviate poverty and bring about favourable economic conditions around the world even better than efforts put into terrorism. According to him:

The fight against terror can prove to be the prelude to a far more unstable and violent world, if wealthy countries don't wake up soon and give the poorest countries reason to believe in the future.

Wolfensohn predicted,

If we have 1.8 billion young people under 15 in a world with 6 billion people, and they don't have a job, food on the table, personal freedom, personal recognition or the hope to become something, what will they do? (Financial Standard 23, Feb. 2004: 9)

He asked, and quickly provided the answer: "they will join any movement or leader offering them something better, even, if it is extremist"

Even with the admonition of Wolfensohn in mind, it is generally believed however, that most violent groups in Nigeria are sated with poor people. Of course, they must be uneducated, and jobless, because, it is difficult to recruit somebody who has a source of livelihood, somebody who is busy, somebody with hopes of living a meaningful life tomorrow, to be part of such senseless actions against the state, their neighbours or the society at large, as terror and vagabonds. An adage says *an idle hand is a devil's workshop*. It was realized that Nigerian youths are wasting away like unpreserved commodities. Some of them resort to criminal acts as an alternative to being idle. We must not forget, even as the adage says, that an energetic young man or woman who does not have a job and therefore, cannot welcome tomorrow with smiles, is a convert that is just waiting to be wooed by the appropriate crime, thereby in flinching wound on efforts at a stable democratic society.

The only way to avert the looming chaos and violence in the society is to ensure that Nigerians feel the impact of government accountability and prudence, in form democratic dividends, that, every Nigerian citizen who is ready and willing to work gets something to do. Even after this, those employed should be given commensurate wages that can cater for their immediate requirement for a good living condition. This is what is considered good governance, especially in the African understanding. Governance that springs from deep thought about how to better the lot of the downtrodden and genuine desire to leave legacies that would compete with diamond for longevity. This is also about getting leaders who will manage the abundant resources in the country well and for the benefit of all Nigerians not only for the selected cronies and opportunists. Leaders who will put the welfare of all Nigerians first above individual selfish interest.

I will however want to conclude this section by quoting the comment of Chinua Achebe (1988: 130-131) when he was paradoxically analyzing the significance of good leadership and account-ability in our search for good governance and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. To him: the problem in Nigeria can't be massive corruption though its scale and pervasiveness are truly intolerable; it isn't the subservience to foreign manipulation, degrading as it is; it isn't even this second-class, hand me down capitalism, ludicrous and doomed. All such miseries of malice and incompetence or greed could be blamed for the prime failure of the government.

He was of the notion that these were not the cause; rather they were actually the effects. The cause was to be found elsewhere. To him the cause lays in:

the failure of our rulers to re-establish vital inner links with the poor and dispossessed of this country. It was the failure of post colonial communities to find and insist upon means of living together by strategies less primitive and destructive than rival kinship networks, whether of ethnic clientelism or its camouflage in no less

clientelist multi-party systems (see also, Basil 1993: 290-322)

CONCLUSION

The analysis of democracy and governance that we have done in this work has highlighted two basic factors or variables crucial for democratic consolidation: a legitimate regime that enjoys a free and fair selection of its leadership under a stable and predictable political institution for regime succession and a regime of government that is accountable, transparent and responsive to the electorate, with a growing economy that steadily reduces inequality and poverty.

However, the assessment of these important variables of good governance and democratic consolidation present a paradox in Nigeria. To the extent that the nascent democratic regime, since its inception in 1999 have not been at its best, as people expectations of a better hope and opportunities have long been dashed, with the democratic dividends still at its elusive stage to the commoners. Economically, macro-economic stability, fiscal discipline, economic reforms, due process and relatively low inflation rates that the state could claim to have achieved sit alongside weak business confidence, low growth, massive unemployment, and rising inequality between the rich and the poor. While corruption, which the government promised to eradicate at its inauguration continued unabated.

Therefore, urgent attention is required from the government to ensure the system follows an indigenous pattern; a pattern of government that recognizes the nature and character of the people, who perhaps are presently predominantly poor and helpless; rather than an imposed structure that give so much power only to the few elites; if the regime would not follow the usual descent in to political abyss.

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