

Vulnerable Democracies: The Challenge of Legitimacy in Post-Communist Systems

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The "grand failure" of Communism and its collapse in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union have induced a spirited theoretical dispute among scholars — both inside and outside these regions — on the simultaneous transitions from Communist totalitarianism to a democratic order, and from a command economy to free markets. Participants in this debate have focused primarily on different aspects of the economic and institutional reforms in the formerly Communist states, mainly in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and of course, Russia. While much has been written about post-Communist transition in the 1990s, there have been few serious attempts either to systematize this knowledge or to evaluate the methods by which it has been accumulated. We have many facts about the emergence of new political party systems and party cleavages, the adoption of new democratic constitutions and other legislation, privatization, and, more generally, macroeconomic adjustment policies, to mention but a few, but there is, as yet, a general lack of integrative theory. This is largely due to the fact that post-Communist societies, like their predecessor Soviet-type societies, have been mostly the foci of area studies in the traditional sense rather than of the contemporary social

sciences. Although area specialists have a degree of linguistic and bibliographic tools that social scientists are not likely to possess, it is the social sciences, particularly sociology and political science, which provide the most promising concepts and methods for the study of post-Communist transitions. One of these concepts is *political legitimacy*, which contributes important theoretical incentives in analyzing social revolutionary changes in general, and the political and social transformation in all the former socialist countries in particular.

I

Although easily used in political discourse, the concept of legitimacy is a very complex and multifaceted one. It involves both *objective* and *subjective* aspects as well as *cognitive* and *normative* elements, while relating to principles, means, values, and outcomes of the use of power. Most generally, legitimacy is understood either as moral approval, or as sheer acceptance of the status quo of the state's form and rulers by most groups in society (Skocpol, 1994: 32). Objectively, legitimacy would mean a systematic title to rule, as based on certain well defined political processes (Weber), and/or procedural-substantive terms (Habermas). The crucial point here is what may objectively be required to create a propensity among the citizens generally to obey the rulers and the rules.

Such a question may be simply formulated: what makes power legitimate, or what turns it from naked force into willingly accepted authority? Subjectively, a political order or government is regarded as legitimate to "the degree to which it is generally accepted by its citizens" (Lipset, 1981: 22) or is "recognized as having the right to govern" (Giddens, 1990: 357). In other words, legitimacy depends on people's belief that the government they obey has a moral right to be obeyed.

Such definitions are basically in line with the Weberian tradition, in which legitimacy is understood as the degree to which a political order and its institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper. Weber referred to the concept of legitimacy both as a *claim* by a system of domination or its leaders and as the *belief or acceptance* of that claim by the governed.¹ Lipset combines both the objective and subjective aspects of legitimacy by defining this concept as "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset, 1981: 64).

Although the theoretical definitions of legitimacy referred to above were formulated in reference to political systems other than the post-Communist ones, they are fully applicable to the latter. So far, however, little attention has been addressed to the question of legitimacy in the analyses of post-Communist systems, although with the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union a vacuum of legitimacy has been created and in many countries of the region — Albania being perhaps the best case in point — power authority remains fragile and law and order have occasionally broken down. We believe that the degree and the form of power legitimation are crucial intervening variables without which it is impossible to determine the way in which political systems in the formerly Communist-ruled societies will develop. Whether there will be order and stability or further decline, and also whether these societies will emerge and become consolidated as democratic, will depend on how political authority in these countries is actually legitimized. Linz and Stepan (1993) argue that while the question of legitimacy is not

always of great importance for nondemocratic polities, it is of fundamental theoretical and political importance for democracy.

Our intention here is not to deal with the diversities and uncertainties of the post-Communist transformation. Rather, we intend to move the debate about post-Communist transition and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe to the problem of power legitimation, which has rarely been discussed in the recent literature. More specifically, we will focus on the question of whether post-Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are, by virtue of having been elected democratically, legitimate. This question naturally arises when new political establishments are taken into regard. The significance of this issue is such that one cannot fail to address it in analyses which focus on post-Communist societies. Chirot points out that the vulnerability of social systems no longer supported by any faith — such as the case of the Soviet-type systems — should be a lesson to those who study other societies. Not only are post-Communist systems vulnerable, but the twenty-first century, Chirot (1991: xiv) remarks, "will almost certainly be filled with many examples of societies that will collapse because of moral failure and lack of legitimacy."

It is important to realize that democracy and legitimacy are not synonymous. As pointed out by Diamond, founding a democracy and preserving it are two different things.

To be stable, a democracy must be deemed legitimate by the people; they must view it as the best, the most appropriate form of government for their society. Indeed, *because* it rests on the consent of the governed, democracy depends on popular legitimacy much more than any other form of government. The legitimacy requires a profound moral commitment and emotional allegiance, but these develop only over time, and partly as a result of effective performance. Democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice (Diamond, 1993: 49).

Hence, for a political system or government to gain — not just claim — legitimacy, it is not enough that it replaces another one, no matter how illegitimate that other system or government might have been. Legitimacy is an attribute that newly established political systems or governments may acquire or lack *equally*.

II

The international community today has come to a near consensus that only democratic regimes are legitimate.² This principle was explicitly formulated in the 1990 document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which stated that “the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and the legitimacy of all governments.”³ Although there seems for the first time to be a unified view on what constitutes legitimate rule,⁴ we believe that, even when democratically — through free elections — installed, the legitimacy of a political system or a national government cannot be regarded as something inherent in it and, even less, as fully achieved through the elections’ outcome. Popular support expressed through collective action to oust “the bad guys” and mass participation in free elections constitute a *sine qua non* for starting a democratic transition and laying the foundations of power legitimacy in all formerly Communist states.⁵ Yet, elections *per se* are not a sufficient requisite to complete a democratic transition. Neither do they instantly or necessarily generate legitimacy for the new ruling elites, as Bruszt and Stark (1992) and Sakwa (1993), among others, explicitly claim with regard to post-Communist states. We suggest that free elections can only provide some *provisional* legitimacy — or, what one might call *protolegitimacy* — for the democratically elected post-Communist governments. Though provided to the new ruling elites through a constitutional convention, such *provisional* legitimacy needs to be tested through the process of governance for a considerable time in order to be consolidated and regarded as *true* legitimacy, based on the consent of the governed. Kittrie rightly points out that

the legitimacy of power and authority

cannot simply be attributed to a one-time compact constituent assembly, constitution, referendum, or election...For a social contract, or constitution to persist, to survive and to thrive, it must rely on the people’s continuing support, now and in the future. It must rely on an intergenerational acknowledgment of its ongoing legitimacy. It must rely on a continuing popular subscription of its tenets (Kittrie, 1995: 7-8).

Programs presented to the electorate by political parties claiming leadership are, certainly, far less important for the citizens and for the legitimate authority of a government than the *actual* practice of governing. Pusic (1994) remarks that reducing the legitimacy of the post-Communist governments in Eastern Europe to elections is but “a way to abolish democracy.” More important still, democratic elections may *equally* result in fostering a democratic order or a nondemocratic one. Thomas Jefferson spoke frequently of the dangers of “elective despotism,” pointing out that “one hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one” (quoted in Harendt, 1969: 307). History provides a number of cases — Nazi Germany being the most obvious one — when free elections have been bearers of dictatorships. It is not unlikely that similar precedents may be set in some post-Communist countries in which new leaders, credited as “de-communizers” and “genuine democrats,” may, in circumstances that might occasionally seem intractable chaos, step into the shoes of their communist predecessors. Kolakowski deliberately excludes Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia from such a threat. “Political vitality in these countries,” he asserts, “is too widely dispersed, and there do not seem to be dictators in waiting among the really important political elites” (Kolakowski, 1991: 72). Indeed, few would question that democracy in these countries is taking hold. Yet, Russia, Serbia, Albania, and Ukraine provide different examples.⁶ Many American and West European leaders were gravely mistaken in their unconditional support of Albania’s former president Sali Berisha, reiterating that he, like Boris Yeltsin in Russia, was the democratically elected president of his country and, was, therefore, a democratic president. The political chaos and

armed rebellion in Albania during the Spring of 1997 was fueled by outrageous discontent and anger against Berisha's authoritarian and corrupt rule, showing — not for the first time in recent history — how wrong those who claim to champion democracy can be by supporting pseudo-democratic rulers. To be a democratic president one has to govern democratically, not just be elected democratically. As Linz and Stepan put it,

no regime should be called a democracy unless its rulers govern democratically. If freely elected executives (no matter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 15).

Yeltsin's reelection as President of Russia in July of 1996, and Berisha's Democratic Party "victory" in Albania's 1996 parliamentary elections as well as his reappointment as President of Albania under the severe conditions of a state of emergency enforced by him in March of 1997,⁷ can hardly be seen as "steps away" from their totalitarian past, or as a triumph of democracy in these countries. Huntington (1996: 8) rightly points out that threats to the fledgling democracies in post-Communist societies are most likely to come from "political leaders and groups who win elections, take power, and then manipulate the mechanisms of democracy to curtail or destroy democracy." In other words, the problem with these democracies is "not overthrow but erosion: the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it" (Huntington, 1996: 8). Ample evidence — the military assault on the Parliament building in 1993, and the brutal suppression of the breakaway region of Chechnya being obvious cases in point — indicate that Yeltsin's rule in Russia has grown authoritarian. This threatens to undermine the democratic process in this country no less, though in a different way, than an eventual "red return." Similarly, Berisha's authoritarian rule in Albania and his continuous attempts to silence and eliminate all political opposition and brutally

repress popular revolt showed clearly how real is the threat of a reverse wave of authoritarianism to some of the East European fragile democracies.

III

It seems that the problem of assessing the legitimacy of power becomes all the more complicated by the fact that legitimacy can be attributed by the people either to the system (as an abstraction) or to the way it actually functions and to those actually wielding power. With regard to legitimacy, Lipset distinguishes the *political system* and its sources of authority, on the one hand, from the *agent of authority* (a president, a parliament, or a cabinet), on the other. These two kinds of legitimacy can be mutually exclusive, although they may also reinforce each other. In Lipset's view,

the agent of authority may be strongly opposed by the electorate and may be changed by the will of the voters, but the essence of the rules, the symbol of authority, must remain respected and unchallenged. Hence, citizens obey the laws and rules, even while disliking those who enforce them (Lipset, 1994: 8).

In regard to post-Communist states, Lipset's idea could be translated as follows: The vast majority of people in Central and Eastern Europe supported — and indeed brought about — the change of Communist order, providing, thus, a strong legitimacy basis for the emerging post-Communist systems. However, the new governing elites in these countries, who came to serve as the agent of authority in the newly established political systems, did not and do not enjoy the same degree of popular support as did the action for systemic change.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, post-Communist elites initially gained power on behalf of democratic principles. Those who delegitimized Communism, did so in the name of democracy. Democratic institutions and democratic principles of governing were demanded everywhere, undermining whatever was left from the past legitimacy of Sovietism and fostering the legitimacy basis of post-Communism. New governing elites also took office through legitimate means. Nevertheless, the initial successes of post-Communist elites were essentially based on promises of systemic change

rather than outright endorsement of specific political parties or individuals. Rose recognizes the problem of distrust as part of this phenomenon. He argues.

The new regimes of Eastern Europe are democratic in the sense that free, competitive, and regular elections are now held, but voting fails to produce representative government, for the winners do not represent established institutions. In general, the citizens of post-Communist Eastern Europe do *not* trust the parties that they vote for. The legacy of distrust is so great that, if forced to choose, a majority of East Europeans would prefer weak and ineffective government to strong government (Rose, 1994: 19).

Generally speaking, the new governing elites in post-Communist states will enjoy popular support and will be granted legitimacy to the extent that, and for only as long as, they prove themselves able to carry out the changes anticipated by the majority of the people. The very factors — erosion and loss of legitimacy — that provoked the failure of Communist authoritarian systems in Eastern Europe set challenges for the new post-Communist elites in all these countries. Referring to the first post-Communist government in Hungary, Kis (1991) stated that “the legitimacy of the new leaders barely exceeds that of the old ones; the new government will have to demonstrate economic success in order to be accepted.”

The 1994 parliamentary elections in Hungary proved Kis’s point, as did the 1993 elections in Poland, and in other countries. There is ample evidence that popular support and faith in the first wave of non-Communist leaderships declined significantly in every country of the region. The same public that cast out the Communist parties in Eastern Europe voted their Socialist successors back into power in successive elections. By 1997, Socialists had made impressive gains, returning to office in several countries — Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania — and enjoy renewed popularity even where they have not (yet) made significant electoral inroads.⁸

The return of Socialists in these countries cannot be understood merely as an expression of nostalgia for the *ancien régime*, although

nostalgic feelings for a radiant Communist past certainly exist among various groups of the population in virtually all the former Socialist countries. Socialist victories in Poland in the 1993 parliamentary elections as well as in the 1995 presidential elections, in Hungary and Bulgaria in their 1994 parliamentary elections, in Albania in the 1997 parliamentary elections, hardly reflect a longing for one-party autocracy. Old-style Communism has been repudiated, and it is highly unlikely that any electorate anywhere would want to revive the system and willingly resubmit themselves to Communist authoritarian rule (Tarifa and Weinstein, 1995/96: 67). To interpret the return of the Socialists to power in some countries as a triumph of the old Communists is oversimplified and wrong. Rather, this is the result of the failure of the post-Communist governing elites in their first attempts to apply new democratic rules and principles effectively and to provide a clear alternative for the future. Schöpflin observes that while the post-Communists were successful in de-legitimizing Communist rule by reference to an ideal vision of democracy, they have largely failed to translate this visionary model into policy (Schöpflin, 1994).⁹

A factor of great importance is, of course, the decline in the standard of living for the bulk of the population in most post-Communist countries. This is all the more important given the initial grandiose promises made to the electorate in these countries by the anti-Communist opposition. Although the economy has improved in virtually all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so far only a small segment of their populations enjoy the economic progress that has been made. Also, one should take into consideration that although Socialist parties emerged everywhere in Eastern Europe as successors of the old Communist parties, for an increasing number of people in these countries the Socialists are no longer identified with the former Communists. One reason is that most Socialist politicians in Central and Eastern Europe today are too young to have been on top in the past, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the mistakes of the past nor be tainted by complicity with the old regimes. Rather, these politicians are widely perceived as representing a “new”, forward-looking, and

pragmatic generation of politicians.¹⁰ Another reason is that none of the Socialist parties in these countries is opposed to privatization and liberalization of markets. Indeed, economic as well as legal and constitutional reforms were able to proceed in all these countries in large part due to the Socialists' support in their respective parliaments. Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski (1996: 145) push this argument even further, concluding that "in countries where democracy has taken root, ex-Communist elites have on balance, contributed to, not undermined, the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions." More importantly still, the Socialists in Eastern Europe — except for Milosevic's Socialist Party in Serbia — do not seek to restore totalitarianism.

IV

Post-Communism has not, as yet, developed a stable and genuinely effective democratic order. "New democracies," Lipset (1994) points out, "must be institutionalized, consolidated, become legitimate." The paradoxical correlation among democracy, popular consent, legitimacy, and efficiency is best expressed in Diamond's (1990: 50) formula: "Democracy requires consent. Consent requires legitimacy. Legitimacy requires effective performance."

The strong popular support which enabled the post-Communist elites to come to power provided merely some *minimum* — although necessary — condition for legitimacy. In those cases where the shift to post-Communism involved populist sentiments and populist leaders, such as Russia, Serbia, Croatia, and Albania, the new elites did not gain more legitimacy. As Dahl (1962: 46) pointed out more than two decades ago, populist democracies would not necessarily increase the legitimacy of governmental bodies or decisions. Although some post-Communist governments — e.g. in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia — have thus far succeeded in fulfilling certain expectations of the electorate at large while maintaining a relatively high degree of popular consent, their legitimacy remains problematic unless they are able to perform efficiently for a considerably longer time. Sartori observes:

Unless a democracy succeeds in creat-

ing, over time, a constant basic consensus, it performs as a difficult and fragile democracy...While basic consensus is not a prerequisite of democracy, it certainly is a helpful condition. For one thing, it helps to establish its legitimacy (1987: 90).

Generally, transition periods do not bestow strong incentives for regime legitimacy. Lipset (1994) argues that it is particularly post-authoritarian regimes, including post-Communist regimes, that are "inherently low in legitimacy." There is, among other reasons, a great deal of uncertainty about many outcomes of transition which raise fundamental doubts about the legitimacy of the state. In post-Communist societies in particular, the dynamics of legitimacy is determined by a number of factors that are not yet adequately understood. There is, as yet, virtually no democratic tradition in these countries and no civil society in which a public sphere can emerge and work as a democratic institution. The means of executing power — the institutions — still have to be built and effective performance has to be demonstrated. Furthermore, new ruling elites have no governing experience on which to base a claim to their legitimate authority. Additionally, successive change of governing elites, particularly in the first phase of post-Communist transition, can only be at the expense of political stability. As many scholars have noted, continuity is crucial to political stability. So far, it is only where there was charismatic leadership that the new governments arguably engendered more substantial trust among their own populations. This holds true particularly for the founding post-Communist presidencies, with Václav Havel, Arpad Göncz, and Lech Walesa obtaining much stronger popular support and an initial level of legitimate authority than other rulers of post-Communist states in their earlier stages of transition. Their activity and credibility as dissident leaders under Communist rule did much to launch and legitimate the new democratic orders in their respective countries.¹¹

Weber's discussion of charismatic authority is important in this regard because it draws attention to the way in which political orders emerge, change, or are overthrown. Although it

seems often to have been a crucial — if not decisive — factor in times of sharp crisis and revolutionary social transformation, the charismatic bond is an ephemeral phenomenon; it is inevitably eroded by time and circumstance.¹² This largely explains why it was possible for Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Poland's current Socialist President, to unseat the charismatic Solidarity leader and icon Lech Wałęsa in Poland's most recent presidential elections. The defeat of charismatic Berisha in Albania's recent elections is yet another significant example.

V

Whatever their sources of legitimacy, post-Communist governments need time to make their policies work. Therefore, long-term legitimacy and stability in post-Communist states will remain open to question for a relatively long time. Post-Communist governments will be legitimized by the intelligence they show and by their ability to overcome chaos and to deliver both economic and political goods to their citizens. These governments will need to prove that they are democratic and reasonably capable and effective — certainly more effective than their predecessors — rather than just non-communist or anti-communist. Anti-Communist rhetoric alone cannot provide a long-term basis for political legitimacy. Indeed, as Holmes (1993) rightly observes, governments whose only source of legitimacy is a quickly fading memory of the euphoric end of Sovietism appear to be rather short-lived. Their political capacity depends critically on the type of institutions that will emerge and develop and their effectiveness. Post-Communist governments, having no traditional legitimacy, face a catch-22. If they want to survive and gain legitimacy, these governments must prove the capacity to perform effectively; but though capacity itself is a matter of degree, in order to be reasonably effective, the new institutions must have a moderate aura of legitimacy.

To summarize, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe face a major challenge: setting up, maintaining, and fostering legitimate democratic systems in terms of a *continuous process* and *prolonged effectiveness*. So far, this proc-

ess has been severely impeded by the pace of economic reform imposed upon them. Since economic performance had been a very important factor in the withdrawal of legitimacy from their Communist predecessors, major economic deterioration cannot be risked beyond the immediate short term. The economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe have drastically affected people's basic entitlements and thus their economic *security*. For many people in these countries even the shoddy economic security they once had now seems preferable to the rough and tumble of a global marketplace in which they will be losers for a long time to come. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that in successive elections the electorate in several countries preferred the Socialists' approach, which is now modeled on Western social-democratic platforms. Designed to lessen the burdens of shifting away from the command economy, such an approach aims to generate government-mandated public goods in certain areas (e.g. education, health, transportation, etc), thus providing some form of economic safety net for all citizens as well as some alleviation of gross economic inequality.

The challenge of legitimacy in post-Communist societies is of such magnitude that, in our view, *political* rather than economic transformation should receive primary attention by new governing elites, as well as by foreign governments and international organizations. For one thing, whatever the outcome of the elections in Central and Eastern Europe, in Russia, and in the former Soviet republics, it is highly unlikely that they will turn back to a command economy and Communist regimes. The move to free markets in all these countries now has a momentum of its own, proceeding despite political process, not because of it. Time, after all, is on the side of further economic reform. All post-Communist countries will undoubtedly have capitalism. The question is what kind and whether capitalism will grow parallel with legitimate democratic institutions in these countries. The lack of political and juridical processes of legitimation of power authority forms a major obstacle to a successful transition to democracy and a reasonably functioning market economy. Under such circumstances, certain

post-Communist countries may not be able to create a "capitalism with a human face." As Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Russia's most celebrated poet, rightly observes, capitalism could just be "a hidden form of Czarism, or even another dictatorship, just as socialism had been."¹³ One can thus conclude with Schmitter and Karl that if only democracies "can be expected to govern effectively and legitimately," then post-Communist governments will become efficient and gain legitimacy by the degree to which they grow as democratic systems.

Notes

1. For an excellent discussion on this issue see J. Bensman (1979).
2. G. Poggi (1990: 28) suggests the term "democratic legitimation" to denote a characteristic of most contemporary states.
3. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference of the Human Dimension of the CSCE, June 1990. Reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 29 (September 1990) p. 1305. This was spelled out further in the 1991 Charter of Paris, adopted at the summit meeting of the CSCE states.
4. For further discussion on this issue see Gottlieb (1993, chap. 2).
5. A number of authors (Gross, 1992; Stojanovic, 1991) regard free elections in post-Communist states as the most important legitimizing procedure of the new polity.
6. Authoritarian tendencies among post-Communist elites and leaders prevail also in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see *The Economist*, 18 March 1995, p. 40.
7. Albania's parliamentary elections of May 1996 — the most criticized in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall — as well as Berisha's reappointment as President of Albania under a state of emergency enforced by him cast a shadow on the prospects for democratic progress in this country. As was widely broadcast by the media, the three major opposition parties — the Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the Democratic Alliance — as well as a number of other opposition parties, withdrew from the May 1996 elections, condemning them as a "coup d'état" organized by President Berisha and his ruling Democratic Party. A Communist witch hunt, stipulated in two lustration laws in September 1995, banned opposition Socialist, Social-Democratic, and Democratic Alliance party leaders from contesting these elections, which were organized by the ruling administration and were held under strong surveillance by the secret police. These laws, as well as numerous violations of basic democratic rules, both inside and outside polling stations, enabled President Berisha to consolidate his increasingly autocratic rule. This became even more clear when Berisha enforced a state of emergency to crush civilian uprisings against his dictatorial rule in the Spring of 1997. Berisha and his misnamed Democratic Party lost in the parliamentary elections held in June/July 1997, in which the Socialists won the majority of parliamentary seats. Berisha resigned immediately after these elections since he had been left with virtually no support.
8. Russia's December 1995 parliamentary elections, in which the refurbished Communists led by Gennadi Zyuganov won more than twice as many seats as any other political party, is — for a number of reasons which will not be dealt with in this essay — a somewhat different story. Scholars and political analysts do not share a common description of the processes unfolding in Russia and disagree on how to explain them.
9. Vaclav Klaus remarks that in countries like Poland or Hungary where the Socialists have come back the real debate is not so much between communists and anti-communists but "between those who are more pragmatic and administratively capable versus the first group that came to power after all the revolutions in those countries and have failed to make things any better." (*New Perspectives Quarterly*, 1996, 13(2): 13).
10. For an excellent analysis of the changes among political elites and the Socialist comeback in Central and Eastern Europe, see Jigley, Kullberg and Pakulski (1996).
11. Havel, Göncz, and Walesa had spent time in jail under the old regime, and therefore, Holmes observes, they "symbolized the courage and decency of anti-Communist dissidents." Contrary to other post-Communist presidents (e.g. Milan Kucan in Slovenia, Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia, or Leonid Kravchuk in Ukraine), who due to their previous engagement as members of the former apparat represented "the break with a hated federation, rather than the break with communism," Havel, Göncz and Walesa were untainted by complicity with the former system, and, therefore, their presidency made "visible their countries' break with the past and the founding of a new democracy" (Holmes, 1993/94).
12. Weber (1947: 362) argued that charisma can provide merely a transitory basis for authority, which lasts "only as long as the belief in its charismatic inspiration remains." On this basis, Weber developed his concept of the "routinization of charisma." According to Weber, "In its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both" (*Ibid.*, p. 364).
13. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 1996, 13(2): 8, interview with Y. Yevtushenko.

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