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Post-Communist Barriers to Democracy and Democratic Political Culture: The Case of Poland[1]

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The recent worldwide trend of democratization has led some of the most respected names in political science to take up the subject of transitions to, and consolidation of, democracy (See Linz and Stepan 1997; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). As Diamond (1994) notes, this work has overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of institutional choice and design and elite crafting for the consolidation of democracies. Not surprisingly, many new democracies have taken almost authoritarian steps to ram through institutions and economic "shock therapies" that provide conducive structures for democracy and capitalism.

While research on developing democracies has emphasized the building of democratic institutions, work on the already established industrial democracies has noted the importance of an active, engaged citizenry for an effectively functioning democracy (Putnam, 1995). As Almond (1994) notes, there has been a return to prominence of political culture and its relation to the performance of democracy. Such theories, which go back at least to Aristotle, often oppose the characteristics of authoritarian culture with its opposite, democratic culture. On the one hand, an authoritarian culture includes such traits as faith in powerful leaders, hatred of outsiders and deviates, a sense of powerlessness and ineffectiveness, extreme cynicism, suspicion and distrust of others, and dogmatism (see Diamond, 1994: 12). On the other hand, a democratic culture consists of such characteristics as, "flexibility, trust, efficacy, openness to new ideas and experiences, tolerance of differences and ambiguities, acceptance of others, and an attitude toward authority that is neither 'blindly submissive' nor 'hostilely rejecting' but rather 'responsible...even though always watchful'" (Diamond, 1994: 12).

A democratic political culture encourages a public spiritedness that is concerned with the common good of all the citizens of a state. It is oriented towards modern, as opposed to traditional, types of rules and authority (Diamond, 1994). Recently this concern with political culture has spread to new, transitioning and consolidating, democracies which often face difficult challenges in the establishment of a democratic political culture (Diamond, 1994). The obstacles seem especially high in post-Communist states. Forty to seventy years of these states' attempts to atomize individuals led to massive distrust (of individuals and institutions) and lack of familiarity with democratic association. Poland, however, would be the top choice as an exception to this rule. There the massive Solidarity movement built social ties and trust from the ashes of "real existing socialism" and sowed the seeds of a democratic political culture. Despite this experience and the nine years since the round table agreements, the barriers to the creation of a democratic political culture and an effectively functioning democracy in Poland remain high. This paper will examine the Polish political culture during the socialist period and use it to make links to the present. As Diamond points out,

> Political culture is better conceived not purely as the legacy of the communal past but as a geological structure with sedimentary

> deposits from many historical ages and events (1994:230).

The Polish "geological structure" of political culture will then inform an evaluation of democracy in Poland today. Before focusing on Poland, however, it will be necessary to address one of the weaknesses of much of the political culture literature: the unclear linkages between a democratic political culture and democracy. Here I will draw on Jeff Weintraub's work (1992) on the republican virtue tradition to highlight the interrelations between political culture, political society, civil society, and the state.

The Republication Virtue Theory

As opposed to the prominent dichotomous theories of civil society and the state, Tocqueville's theory utilized a tripartite distinction between civil society, political society, and the state[2]. According to Weintraub (1992: 57), the *state* consists of the fairly centralized apparatus of administration and control, *civil society* is the realm of individualistic relations primarily focused on private life and the market, and *political society* is a public arena that mediates between civil society and the state through collective action, cooperation, and conflict between and among citizens. In Weintraub's language,

> Political society is the whole realm of activities oriented toward voluntary concerted action, conscious solidarity, and the discussion and collective resolution of public issues. As an analytical category it cuts across the more obvious division between governmental and non-governmental, excluding much administration and including ...local self-government, voluntary association, trial by jury, some aspects of religion, and so on (1992: 59).

For Tocqueville, the relatively low risk association in political society teaches citizens to organize civil associations and to subordinate their wills to those of others for the common good. Political associations, as Tocqueville (1899, 2: 124-5) famously noted, are "large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association." While political associations positively influence activity in civil associations, civil associations, in turn, promote political participation through creating feelings of duty among the citizens; decreasing the always tempting tendency in a capitalist democracy towards self-interest, and demonstrating to participants the interdependence of everyone in the society. Furthermore, this involvement creates a habit of participation and an increased ability for citizens to organize, without the entry of the state, to undertake greater enterprises. These characteristics thus promote further political association (Tocqueville, 1899).

What emerges out of all of this association is citizens understood not only as the bearers of rights, but also as active members of the political community. The citizens acting as a collective form a political community of solidarity composed of autonomous and equal individuals able to work for some common good and to act to oppose centralised state power. They develop skills and values such as moderation and tolerance which, combined with democratic institutions, make democracy work (Weintraub, 1992).

Some problems with this theory have been noted recently. Most importantly for this work, participation in militia, ethnic, or religious groups (certainly other examples exist) that oppose the norms and ideals of democracy is not likely to promote a democratic political culture among the members of society (Seligman, 1992). Furthermore, if such groups are prominent and active in a state, the development or enhancement of a democratic political culture may be hindered in the rest of society. However, a democratic political culture could act as an obstacle to the development and empowerment of such groups (Szacki, 1995). A democratic culture would be especially important in states where the return to tradition is so tempting for citizens. It would promote participation in more "civic" oriented groups, which would return the favour by helping to consolidate this democratic political culture.

Political society, then for its proper functioning needs a democratic political culture and vice versa. The combination creates a public sphere of solidarity, dialogue, collective action, and conflict. Citizens acting in this sphere are not solely interested in their own interest, but in "self-interest rightly understood" (Tocqueville,

1899). That is, they present their interests but attempt to find a solution that takes into account other interests or the common good. Political society (with a democratic political culture) thus represents a mediator between civil society and the state. It protects against the ravages of excessive individualism and the arbitrary and bureaucratic acts of the powerful state. This division between civil society, political society, and the state will serve as a useful tool to illuminate Poland under "real existing socialism" and at present.

Poland's "Real Existing Socialism"

As is now well-documented, the former Soviet-type societies of Central and Eastern Europe attempted to atomize the individual citizens (Arendt, 1951; Milosz, 1980; Gellner, 1994). Though never fully achieved in practice, such efforts represented a desire to collapse civil society, political society, and the state into one (Kolakowski, 1974). Many of these states came close to this goal, at least during the Stalinist period. A few years after Stalin's death in 1953 the ideological period of Communism began to recede in Poland. Ekiert (1991: 300) argues that the regime in its post-ideological phase made a bargain with the citizens to not interfere in what he calls "domestic society," — that is "the domain of purposeful action restricted to the private sphere and organized in terms of material needs and self-interest" — as long as the citizens continued to not become involved in voluntary associations or other "political" actions and as long as individuals publicly acted as if they believed the ideology of Communism.

This bargain in best understood as the allowance of some stunted form of civil society, but the continued prohibition of the public sphere of political society, forcing parts of it into the state and parts of it into the private sphere of civil society. In neither case were the transferred remnants of political society able to perform the functions outlined in republican virtue theory. "Transmission belt" associations, closely allied with the party-state, aided instead of hindered the state in arbitrary and bureaucratic uses of power. *Srodowiska* (a loose translation of this term would be social circles or milieux) developed to overcome economic shortages, but worked to increase individualism. In such an environment, a political culture of tolerance, moderation, and orientation to the common good was unlikely to develop. However, it was in this environment that the Polish opposition attempted to create a political society and something similar to a democratic political culture.

Throughout the late fifties and all of the sixties the Polish dissidents addressed their demands to the party-state. However, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw pact states and the purge of revisionists from the Polish party shattered the dreams of revisionism. It was in this despondent time that exile (and former Marxist) Leszek Kolakowski wrote his renowned essay *Hope and Hopelessness* (1971). He asserted that the real chance for reform was not reform from above through revision of the party but through pressure from below by social movements. Bernhard (1993) argues that this change in resistance strategies from dissidence — addressing "grievances to the party-state, demanding that it behave better" — to opposition, which concentrated on society and the development of movements from below was the crucial insight for the Polish opposition. It spawned the Polish opposition theory and, ultimately, the development of the Solidarity movement (Bernhard, 1993; Ost, 1990; Lipski, 1985).

The strategy that the opposition developed came to be called "new evolutionism," after the title of Adam Michnik's highly influential essay of 1976 (republished in Michnik 1986).[3] New evolutionism did not attempt to overthrow the party-state. Michnik and other opposition theorists were all too aware of the "geopolitical realities" of Poland's situation: the Soviet presence and the demonstrated commitment of Soviet leaders to use force (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968) if the leading role of the Communist party was challenged (Michnik, 1986; Kuron, 1977). Instead, new evolutionism advocated the creation of a realm of diverse, autonomous, independent associations that would concentrate on "an unceasing struggle for reform and evolution that seeks an expansion of civil liberties and human rights" (Michnik, 1986; 142).[4] Most frequently, demands made by

opposition groups were limited to calls for the regime to play by its own rules, for example to obey the law and not violate international treaties it had signed

In the environment of Poland in the 1970's, elements of a democratic political culture had to be promoted, at least in individuals, prior to their involvement in the types of associations described above. The opposition basically focused on four general policies: openness, truthfulness, autonomy of action, and trust (Schell, 1986). It was the development of such qualities that allowed individuals to step out into political society. As it was pointed out by Szacki,

> the postulate of autonomy and emancipation of the individual had to be directed above all to his or her participation in public life and be a declaration of rights to cross over the limits of privateness, in which nearly everything that was in conflict with the official ideology had been confined (1995: 88).

Without such policies, fear and distrust would keep individuals in "internal emigration" or at least reduce the realm of solidarity, community, and dialogue to private, close circles of family and friends.

The opposition theory sought to overcome the artificial elimination of the public sphere of political society and, concomitantly, to develop elements of a democratic political culture in the populace. The opposition was interested in creating a realm of voluntary action, solidarity, dialogue, and diversity. This realm was not to be driven by a culture of hate and fear but by attitudes of trust, tolerance, openness, and autonomy. This potential political society could be understood primarily as a protection against arbitrary acts of the state,[5] but also would be a bar to excessive individualism.

The Solidarity Movement

While theories similar to those of the Polish opposition were developed elsewhere in East Central Europe, in the rest of the region only a small number of dissident intellectuals ever really participated in autonomous organizations[6]. In Poland, however, the early opposition had a major effect on the ten-million-member-strong Solidarity movement and, in fact, many of the intellectual leaders of Solidarity came out of the early opposition (Bernhard, 1993; Lipski, 1985; Ash, 1985; Szacki, 1995). Members of Solidarity made up almost 30 per cent of Poland's entire population and over half of its workers. Solidarity, like the earlier opposition, staunchly defended civil and human rights and promoted democracy (Ash, 1985; Szacki, 1995). It favoured, and sheltered under its umbrella, many diverse associations such as environmental organizations and farmer's groups. Discussion was an important method for coming to collective decisions. Solidarity provided the chance for the theorized political society to be put into practice and for a democratic political culture to be internalized by the Polish masses.

However, it was not to be. As Solidarity progressed from a local strike at a Gdansk shipyard to a nationwide movement, national and religious symbols became more and more prominent. The importance of the autonomous citizen was lost. Szacki argues:

> In contrast to the democratic opposition of the 1970s, Solidarity from the very outset constituted itself not as a nascent community of like-minded individuals but as the representative of an *already existing community* (whether defined in class or national categories), which demanded the satisfaction of its needs. The decision to join the movement was based not so much on an individual moral choice as on whether a person regarded himself or herself as a member of the community. The main motive was consciousness of belonging and the desire to be *together*. While it is true that Solidarity was also a kind of 'moral crusade}, the subject of the crusade in this case was not individuals; it was the collectivity understood as a *collective subject* striving to regain its rights, which appeared absolutely unquestionable because they were vested in the collectivity (1995: 114-5).

The notion of the virtuous individual participating as a citizen began to fade before symbols of Catholic Polish nationalism (Kubik, 1994). The visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland in June of 1979 had been an emphatic reminder of Polish society's strength. Instead of internalizing the

ideals of the opposition of the 1970's, Polish citizens remembered from the Solidarity movement the organic us versus them, nation versus state, a vision that was so powerful for a nation that had been kept alive only in memory during so many years of occupation. The movement came to take on, in some senses, a noticeably traditional air; the solidarity it strove for was no longer so much that of citizens in a political community but of the collective identity of a nation.

Martial Law and After

The Church's Power Position

Though religious symbolism played a prominent role during the Solidarity period, the Church was not specifically involved with the negotiations with the regime at that time. It remained primarily concerned with promoting civil and human rights. However, this changed after the declaration of martial law in December 1981. At this point, both the party-state and Solidarity began to pursue the Church as an ally (Ost, 1993). The Church used this as an opportunity to increase its power and its involvement in politics. This involvement only intensified with Pope John Paul II's appointment of Jozef Glemp to the position of Polish primate in 1984. Primate Glemp, for example, argued against notions of pluralism, the secular, state, and even tolerance (Ost, 1993). In addition, the Church used its new powerful intermediate position to pursue goals counter to both the ideals of Communists and the secular opposition such as hanging crosses in public schools. As Ost points out,

> The problem is that modern secular rules, such as nondenominational education and the separation between church and state, were fully instituted in Poland only by Communism. Consequently, the Church has been able to present its campaign against liberalism as an ongoing part of the struggle against Communism (1993:21).

It is not surprising, then, that the Church continues to be one of the major actors in Polish political society and that it persists in promoting a type of Polish Catholic nationalism that is often intolerant, exclusive, and authoritarian. It has, for example, led the crusade for required religious classes in public schools. In its efforts to speak for the Polish nation, the Church since martial law has worked to make political society an arena of decree rather than dialogue. It has attempted, in some sense, a collapse of political society into the state. The political culture it has promoted has been rather more authoritarian than democratic.

The Endurance of the Private

As noted earlier, in the post-ideological phase in Poland, the party-state allowed some room for maneuver in the sphere of civil society and personal relations instead of striving for complete atomization. As a result, *srodowiska* — small groups of people closely connected through ties of kinship or friendship — emerged[7] (Wedel, 1992). *Srodowiska* were important for two main reasons: First, they allowed individuals to use connections within the *srodowisko* (the singular of *srodowiska*) to acquire scarce goods that were unavailable through the inefficient centrally planned economy. Second, it was a realm in which members could take off the public masks of conviction that they were often forced to wear in the workplace and in public. Instead of "internal emigration," individuals could at least be relatively free in word and expression among this group. In conditions of shortage (as was frequently the case in Poland), intense rivalry between *srodowiska* often developed. That is, within each *srodowisko* strong ties of trust and openness developed, but massive distrust of those outside the *srodowisko* formed[8]. As has been argued by Wedel (1992: 14), "like military elites and religious cults, they [*srodowiska*] induced obligation and intense loyalty through shared ordeal."[9]

If the activities of Solidarity in 1980 and 1981 had led directly to a regime change, it may have been possible for the opposition theory of the time to overcome the distrust and secrecy that developed between competing *srodowiska*. However, Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, and the resultant banning of Solidarity forced Solidarity and other opposition leaders underground. Under such circumstances, even the opposition became broken up into *srodowiska*, and therefore, closed and distrustful of outsiders (Arkuszewski, 1992).

Further, the deteriorating economic conditions during the 1980s inevitably increased to an even greater extent the saliency of *srodowiska*. While it might be assumed that *srodowiska* would lose their power with the transition to a market economy, this has decidedly not been the case. Instead, the continuation of elements of the state-socialist economic structure, the unstable economic conditions, and high unemployment have led to the continuing efficacy (and necessity?) of *srodowiska*.

The endurance of the *srodowiska* has created obstacles to the development of a democratic culture. Instead of the common good, there is the good of the *srodowiska*; instead of openness, there is secrecy. *Srodowiska* continue the collapse of much that is political into civil society, public into private. Political society, with its lack of a democratic culture, cannot hinder the excessive individualism that the *srodowiska* inspire.

Elite Loss of Faith in Popular Participation

The declaration of martial law led to a decrease in reverence for the concepts of new evolutionism and the self-limiting revolution. As a result, the opposition fragmented with groups advocating national sovereignty and economic liberalism gaining strength (Smolar, 1988). While Solidarity leaders remained the symbolic leaders of the opposition, their views were no longer representative of the views of society. Furthermore, the uncertain conditions of martial law polarized the remnants of Solidarity, dividing it into regional groups with some portions underground and some above ground.

One split in Solidarity during martial law is especially fundamental for this paper; the Jaruzelski regime differentiated treatment of workers and intellectuals from the Solidarity movement in order to divide the opposition. Repression against the intelligentsia was much less severe than that against workers (Smolar, 1988). This had important consequences when the regime and the opposition entered into the round table negotiations since the "opposition" consisted primarily of intellectuals from the solidarity movement. They had remained the symbolic leaders of the opposition though, as noted above, they were no longer representative of the opposition as a whole. An emphasis on stability in these negotiations — only 35 per cent of seats in the Sejm slotted for popular election, the chance for the regime to continue its stranglehold on defence and foreign policy — led to charges of collusion between the regime and Solidarity intellectuals.[10] In part because of the more and more traditional and collectivist nature of society (as well as, later, pressure from international organizations), policy matters such as economic "shock therapy" were kept out of the realm of collective decision-making.

Elite negotiations and policies were thus an attempt to drastically minimize the importance of political society. With such a weak political society, a passive citizenry as opposed to an active one would be favoured by leaders and is likely to develop: why participate if it doesn't matter? These leaders apparently felt that authoritarian tendencies were necessary to ensure the development of democratic and liberal institutions (Ost, 1993). With such policies, excessive individualism is likely to occur. Political society's ability to moderate this inordinate individualism and also acts of the state is greatly reduced.

The Dual Society and the Uncertainty of Interests

The social and economic transformation that has yet to be completed in Poland creates difficulties for the development of political society and a democratic political culture. The problem is due to the emergence of a dual society, that is, a dual social structure with portions connected to the developing market economy and other sections tied to the still-hanging-on state socialist structure (Bernhard, 1996). As a result, interests, in a democratic sense, have not yet crystallized with the reforms still far from complete. Instead, the population is cleaved into pro-reform — aligned with the market economy — and anti-reform camps — aligned with the vestiges of the state socialist structure (Bernhard, 1996; Kolarska-Bobinska, 1994). Revindicative protests to transfer funds to anti-reform groups work to maintain the remnants of the state-socialist structure. While Ekiert and Kubik (1996) see these protests as an indication of the strength

of political society, Bernhard argues otherwise:

> While such revindicative protests may ...seem to be an indication of the strengthening of civil society (after all, groups demonstrate in order to protect their interests), they are partially etatist in character...While these protests have begun to create organizations which represent a part of the panoply of interests within civil society, as long as protest takes the form of inter-sectoral conflict for resources within the state, it will remain on the border between distributional struggles within the state and articulation of interests vis-a-vis the state (1996: 325).

That is, protests work to continue the patron-client relations of state-socialism between the state and the citizens, thus diminishing participation. They, in some ways, represent the spirit of the subject instead of the spirit of the citizen (Weintraub, 1992: 60). Elite policies beyond debate only work to encourage such behaviour: since individuals do not get a chance to sense that policies are for the common good, they solely defend their own narrow interests.

Post-Communist Poland

The words of some other researchers will give us an idea of the political culture and political society of Poland today. On the one hand, many associations and movements have developed in the post-1989 social landscape. As Kubik and Ekiert note:

> In Poland after 1989, thousands of new organizations and movements sprung up locally and nationally. A comprehensive database, "Klon-Jawor," which tracked the development of associations in Poland, listed 4,515 organizations in 1993, while before 1989 there were only several hundred large, centralized organizations. A year later Klon-Jawor listed 7,000 associations and 4,500 foundations and estimated that 2 million Poles were active in these organizations. They had some 53,000 full-time employees; 64 per cent of their budget came from private and foreign sources and 26 per cent from the state budget (1997: 14).[11]

On the other hand, talk of citizenship and public virtues has receded. As Smolar (1996) points out, the peaceful revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe were carried out in the name of "civil" society, and the related word "citizen" was one of the most frequently used terms in the public discourse of that time.

> Citizens' committees, citizens' assemblies, citizens' initiatives, citizens' parliamentary clubs, and citizens' parties all sprang into being. Today, just a few years later, talk of "civil society" is no longer much heard in the streets, and the idea seems to have gone back whence it came, to discussion held among intellectuals on the changing shape of postcommunist countries (Smolar 1996: 24).

Korbonski describes the situation even more clearly:

> Poland in the second half of 1995 resembled a society which continued to display the characteristics of an uncivil rather than a civil society. Although on the surface there was an impressive proliferation of political associations and voluntary associations, the public values of tolerance, mutual respect, and compromise were largely absent. Instead of working together to find a mutually acceptable solution to a multitude of pressing problems facing the country, the various parties, groups, and individuals have pursued their special narrow interests in total disregard of the common good (1996: 300).

One possible explanation is that there has not yet been enough time since the round table discussion for the sociability from below to work its way up to creating a democratic public culture. I find this explanation overly simplistic. To the extent that such groups as Ekiert and Kubik (1997) identify are opposed to the democratic ideals of discussion, openness, tolerance, and moderation, their existence does little to advance the development of a political society that would support democracy. Religious groups, nationalist associations and parties that have goals counter to a democratic political culture are quite active in Poland today. Further, "checkbook" associations, to use Putnam's (1995) language, do little to increase political participation or political society as it is here understood. They may represent interests, but they do not promote (unless that is their specific goal) association and democratic qualities, but, instead common

orientation to symbols and ideologies. Political society in Poland today, while represented by some groups, is weak and, for the most part, unable to protect citizens from the excessive individualism of the market or the state's power.

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to outline a theory that helps to illuminate democratic development at various periods. It is not just presence of democratic institutions and the creation of a market economy that should be used to measure the extent of democracy. It suggests that a better performing democracy depends on the development of a political society of solidarity and collective action and a democratic political culture. With such development, citizens can be protected from both excessive individualism and the intrusions of a powerful state. With the creation of democratic and market institutions, the growing economy, and the eventual membership in NATO, the chances of Poland slipping back to some form of authoritarianism seems slim. Indeed, the influence of the Church has been decreasing recently, with more and more Poles recognizing the importance of separation of church and state. The question then becomes the performance of the democracy. Despite the Solidarity tradition, barriers to a democratic political culture and political society from "real existing socialism" and before remain. The continued usefulness of private *srodowiska* and resulting lack of faith in national institutions, the authoritarian or traditional orientations of many citizens, and the remnants of the state-socialist economic structure hinder the development of political society and a democratic political culture. Elite discouragement of participation and the continuance of policies beyond democratic control only act to continue the efficacy of citizens remaining in the private sphere of civil society and personal relations.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Peter Bearman and Kevin Moore for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2. Here I follow Weintraub's (1996, 1997) understanding of Tocqueville. It is quite useful for analytical clarity considering the multitude of uses of the concept of civil society.
3. New evolutionism later came to be called, in Kuron's term, the "self limited revolution."
4. It is important to note that while the opposition spoke the language of civil society, in the conception I have chosen to employ in this paper this is political society. The Hungarian opposition, however, primarily concentrated on what I have here termed civil society — market relations. What they were concerned with was the re-opening of a public sphere of discussion, voluntary action, and solidarity. This brings out another point: The opposition has often been criticized for its concentration on "anti-politics." Many argue that the "anti-political" orientation of the opposition has had deleterious effects on the development of democracy in Poland because it created a distaste for politics in the populace. Such "anti-politics" was certainly political in a regime which strove to prevent all associations outside state "transmission belts." It just didn't aim to take over the state. While at face value this makes some sense, what I would argue instead is that the felt nationalistic unity that developed during the Solidarity period made the inevitable haggling of politics especially unpleasant.
5. KOR (The Worker's Defence Committee), the organization out of which the majority of the theory described here came, was founded by 14 intellectuals to protect and provide defence for workers who lost their jobs during the strikes of 1976.
6. See Bernhard (1993, especially Chapter 1) for a comparison between the states of the region.
7. Of course, *srodowiska* existed before de-stalinization. However, with de-stalinization they became more prominent and the arenas in which they could operate were expanded.
8. The situation is strikingly similar to how the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment theorized precommercial society. It was only with the rise of impersonal market relations that friendship could be separated from economic interests and thus arise a truly "civil" society (Silver, 1990).
9. This is not to downplay the significance of *srodowiska.* Clearly, they aided many Poles in survival as well as created the possibilities for an opposition movement (and Solidarity) through both financial and "moral" resources. However, they do create problems for the development of a democratic culture and political society.
10. To be fair, with Poland as the first country under Soviet influence to enter into round table discussions, there was an air of uncertainty about the whole process. How would the Soviet Union view an agreement that completely eliminated the influence of the party?
11. The problem after 1989, according to Ekiert and Kubik (1997), was not the demobilization of civil society but the lack of linkages between civil society and the state/political society.

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