

From Human Rights to Global Citizenship Education: Peace, Conflict and the Post-cold War Era

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ABSTRACT In the present paper, the researchers historicize the rise and growth of human rights education (HRE) in the post-Cold War era and importantly, periodize changes in the actors involved in the implementation of HRE, their approaches to HRE programming. The researchers detail three distinct periods that demonstrate the changing nature of warfare in the post-Cold War era: from sectarian, intra-state conflict to the global war on terror. The researchers' narrative points towards possibilities for subsequent research that either asks new questions about HRE programming or explores old questions about HRE programming in new ways. Finally, the researchers explore the shift from HRE to Global Citizenship Education (GCE) and conclude by arguing for continuing and renewed emphasis and action on behalf of HRE, and examine a handful of key principles necessary for programs to realize the promise of human rights education as the new civics education for the new world order.

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago, following the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna on June 25, 1993 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the ten-year period beginning on January 1, 1994 "The United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education" (UNDHRE) (United Nations 1993). The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) soon drafted a Plan of Action for the UNDHRE and a host of UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), national education ministries, and individuals throughout the world mobilized to implement the Plan through a series of on-going conferences, working groups, and initiatives.

In accordance with those provisions, and for the purposes of the Decade, human rights education shall be defined as training, dissemination and information efforts aimed at the building of a universal culture of human rights through the imparting of knowledge and skills and the moulding of attitudes and directed to:

- (a) *The strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;*
- (b) *The full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity;*
- (c) *The promotion of understanding, tolerance, gender equality and friendship among all nations, indigenous peoples and racial, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups;*

- (d) *The enabling of all persons to participate effectively in a free society;*
- (e) *The furtherance of the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace (United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education 1994-2005; United Nations 1993: 3).*

Now two decades later, on September 26, 2012 UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon launched the five-year "Global Education First Initiative" (GEFI) that outlined key education priorities: putting every child in school, improving the quality of learning, and fostering global citizenship via global citizenship education (GCE). UNESCO soon published a number of reports and a host of UN agencies, NGO's, national education ministries, and individuals throughout the world mobilized to implement GCE through a series of on-going conferences, working groups, and initiatives.

Global citizenship education aims to empower learners to engage and assume active roles both locally and globally to face and resolve global challenges and ultimately to become proactive contributors to a more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure, and sustainable world. Core competencies: 1) knowledge and understanding of global issues and trends and knowledge of and respect for key universal values (for example, peace and human rights, diversity, justice, democracy, caring, non-discrimination, tolerance); 2) cognitive skills for critical, creative, and innovative

thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making; 3) non-cognitive skills such as empathy, openness to experiences and other perspectives, interpersonal/communicative skills and aptitude for networking and interacting with people of different backgrounds and origins; 4) behavioral capacities to launch and engage in proactive actions (United Nations Global Education First Initiative; UNESCO 2013: 2).

In the interim, global economic capitalism soared and inter- and intra-state conflict—the precise phenomena which HRE and GCE were in theory intended to counterpose—assumed new proportions and occurred on a mass-scale. In short, rights-based rhetoric and declarations have yet to penetrate the economic, political and social relations amongst and within nations to create a more just world—yet UN agencies march on, first with HRE and now with GCE.

In what follows, the researchers offer a contemporary historical analysis, beginning with the 1994 launch of the UNDHRE, of the rise and expanse of human rights education in the post-Cold War era and the recent “turn” of HRE towards GCE. The researchers also contextualize these shifts and changes within wider accounts of the changing character of conflict concomitant with acceleration of globalization and subsequently the expanse and increasing influence of non-state actors in education policy formation and transfer. Through these lenses the researchers understand and explain relationships within and between states, as well as non-state actors, particularly the conditions under which the expanse of human rights education reflects shifting policy priorities in response to globalization and conflict. For more than twenty-years in response to the impact of globalization and the considering the root causes of warfare and conflict, political leaders and heads of multi-lateral and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have declared with increasing frequency that HRE is a primary means of expanding and strengthening democratic, liberal governance throughout the world and mitigating or helping to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of intractable civil wars. However, as the researchers will explicate, many of the implicit assumptions by multinational institutions and global actors in developing and implementing HRE programming are based on multinational politics and located in a state-centric view of human rights lodged within a Western-legalistic

framework that relies on the logic of universalist principles, that, taken out of context, are used for power

While the researchers agree that “the idea of human rights is compatible with a conception of human rights as universal rights” (Donnelly 2013:1) they also want to suggest that human rights are part of a constantly changing, culture-bound, locally constructed understandings that are historically specific and contingent. Hence the teaching of and learning about human rights should be grounded in a view that frames rights as struggles of disadvantaged groups and in practice is seen as a collective struggle for improved social conditions and human relationships (Baxi 1997). The disjuncture between multilateral human rights regimes (and the evolving global discourse around HRE through the current GCE) and the on-the-ground particularistic understanding of rights as struggles and social movements has largely been ignored in the literature. Putting these distinct bodies of literature in conversation, the researchers suggest, helps to make clear the conceptual and practical constraints of universalist HRE to address global inequities and intra-state conflict or global terrorism and offers an opportunity to consider a more reflective, locally embedded and reconciliatory model of HRE programming.

The researchers proceed by briefly reviewing previous literature framing HRE, which tends to either typologize or alternately to historically-conceptually analyze HRE programming. In sum, these studies trace and detail the evolution and variance in HRE without accounting for it. Alternately stated, context, fundamental to historical reconstruction, is assumed rather than explained. The researchers build upon this literature by providing an integrated narrative that contextualizes shifts and changes to HRE occasioned by the acceleration of globalization and the expanse of global conflict between 1994 to the present, while underscoring the role of international agencies and actors and their intentions. The researchers’ narrative is necessarily suggestive and not exhaustive, though they hope, points towards possibilities for subsequent research that either asks new questions about the why and how of HRE programming to date or revisits old questions about HRE programming in new ways. Finally, the researchers conclude by arguing for continuing and renewed

emphasis for (type of) HRE, (rather than replacing it with GCE),

EMERGING MODELS, DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF HRE

There is near consensus across scholarship that analyzes and explains the rise and expanse of HRE as well as the differing and at times divergent models and definitions of HRE programming that human rights education has been advanced on a global scale (Ramirez et al. 2007). Put forward by world organizations (for example, UN agencies); professional associations (for example, Human Rights Education Association); and international advocacy groups (for example, Amnesty International), HRE can today be found in many national education policies and curricula (Lohrenscheit 2002; Mihr 2009; Mihr and Schmitz 2007; Ramirez et al. 2007). That this is so has been attributed on the one hand to the UN Decade for Human Rights (1994-2005) and later to the World Program for Human Rights (2007-2019) “that created sustained impetus for the development of HRE” (Keet, 2007: 53). On the other hand, some scholars point to the catalytic role played by globalization which has fostered the worldwide dominance of liberal and democratic ideologies, subsequently facilitating the expanse of HRE (Ramirez et al. 2007). Scholars and practitioners, regardless of where they might weigh in on this debate, generally share the belief that HRE can and should be positioned to build a “culture of HRE” in respective countries where HRE has been implemented, and in many cases where there are systematic violations of human rights that result in “cultures of violence.” The notion that a culture of rights, cultivated through HRE, is one of the key measures against “cultures of violence” is widely advanced in various HRE plans (UNESCO 1993, 1994, 2005), reports and evaluations (UNESCO 2000, 2005) and academic scholarship (Andreopoulos and Claude 1997; Holland 2011; Flowers and Lord 2006). Additionally, that human rights education is necessary and necessarily able “to address the human rights problems with which every society struggles” (Bajaj 2011) for many HRE scholars and practitioners seems self-evident. However, for many others, not all models and definitions of HRE are up to the task; their efforts to draw distinctions between emergent approaches allow for critical engagement

with HRE programming and potential analytic frameworks for what does and does not work and why.

Tibbitts (2002; Tibbitts and Fernekes 2011) for example, identifies three predominant models that are “linked implicitly with particular target groups and a strategy for social change and human development” (163). These include the Values and Awareness Model, which focuses on HRE in school curricula and public awareness campaigns as a primary vehicle of transmitting basic knowledge of human rights issues and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the Accountability Model which targets professionals directly involved in public or civil service (for example, lawyers, police officers) and focuses on knowledge related to specific rights instruments and mechanisms of protection; and the Transformational Model which seeks to empower vulnerable populations to recognize human rights abuses and to commit to their prevention. For Tibbitts, the problem lies not in the variance in emergent models of HRE programming, but in the piecemeal implementation of these different models in respective countries as well as an overall dearth of program evaluation (Tibbitts 2002; Tibbitts and Fernekes 2011).

Writing nearly a decade later, Bajaj (2011) distinguishes three different outcomes-based models of HRE that differ in content, approach, and action. HRE for Global Citizenship emphasizes “individual rights as part of an international community [that] may or may not be perceived as a direct challenge to the state” (Bajaj 2011: 492) while HRE for Coexistence, most often implemented in post-conflict settings emphasizes “minority rights and pluralism as part of a larger human rights framework” (ibid.). HRE for Transformative Action seeks to alter unequal power relations between individuals, groups, society, and/or the state by making learners aware of injustices that they and others experience. Echoing Tibbitts (2002), Bajaj (2011) maintains that diversity in HRE approaches can be interpreted as both a testament to HRE’s relevance and its promise as a lasting educational reform.

Alternately, Flowers (2003) takes a different starting point when critically examining variance in HRE models, arguing that, “human rights education lacks not only a clear definition, but also an agreed theoretical basis” (2). Her analysis outlines both the subtle and overt definitional and theoretical nuances of HRE held by UN

agencies, NGO's, and academics and educational thinkers—the three groups that are primarily responsible for developing and implementing HRE programming. While governmental definitions are “characterized by their devotion to goals and outcomes, especially those that preserve the order of the state itself” (Flowers 2003: 3), NGO's regard HRE as a tool for social change designed to limit state power and in some cases seize state power. Academics and educational thinkers “tend to shift the emphasis from outcomes to the values that create and inform those outcomes” (Flowers 2003: 8). Perhaps most significantly, Flowers warns of the potential pitfalls of HRE's competing and divergent definitions, concluding that “we can never be unaware that HRE will always create conflict—clashes of values and cultures, struggles between individuals and the state, disputes among individuals with conflicting rights claims—[and yet] be able to address such conflicts in ways that respect human rights” (Flowers 2003: 17). In this way, HRE, in relation to violations of human rights, can be seen as “cause, effect, problem, and possible solution” (Kirk and Winthrop 2007: 20).

These three predominant typologies, while showing difference in HRE programming, generally refrain from accounting for it. Instead, this task has been taken up by a small cadre of scholars who offer detailed historical analyses of the different institutions, individuals, and key ideas that shaped [differently] the development of HRE. Their accounts often begin in 1948, the year the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in which human rights education was first canonized in Article 26. (Baxi 1997; Flowers 1998; Mihr 2009; Ramirez et al. 2007; Keet 2007). Not long after, UNESCO undertook efforts to disseminate knowledge of human rights throughout the world via human rights education by launching the Associated Schools Project in 1953 (Suarez et al. 2009). One of the first major educational initiatives undertaken by UNESCO, initially several hundred participating schools across all major world regions agreed to promote “respect for human rights and to encourage commitment to a peaceful world order” via curriculum that explicitly reviews content related to the UDHR and other human rights treaties and conventions (Suarez et al. 2009: 199). By 2003, the number of participating schools had grown to more than nine-thousand across 170

nations, the majority of whom joined on or after 1979 with little growth occurring in the first twenty-five years of the program.

Ramirez et al. (2009) by-and-large avoid highlighting the twenty-five year period of dormancy between 1953 and 1979, choosing instead to focus on the supposed global diffusion of human rights norms across a global society indicated by such (eventual) widespread adoption. However, others have found it significant to note that relatively little activity was undertaken to promote human rights or human rights education during the first two decades of the Cold War until the 1970's. Only then did NGO's, particularly Amnesty International, begin to utilize human rights rhetoric to name and shame the occurrence of widespread, state-sponsored rights violations (Cmiel 2004; Moyn 2010; Sikkink 1993; Simmons 2009). Shortly thereafter, UNESCO again picked up the HRE mantle, issuing a “Recommendation Concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation, and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (UNESCO 1974). Seventy-six countries signed the document (Buergethal and Torney 1976), thus indicating support for inclusion of human rights in national curricula. Following the Recommendation, UNESCO sponsored and participated in several human rights education meetings throughout the world for the purpose of clarifying and achieving consensus on the goals and strategies for HRE. As indicated by the wide variance in HRE programming reviewed previously, consensus was far from realized.

Nevertheless, UNESCO and a widening range of NGO's (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) and other UN agencies (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), United Nations Children's Fund) proceeded onwards in their efforts to expand and build consensus around HRE. Culminating in 1993, first with the Montreal Declaration on Human Rights Education followed by the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna and the resultant Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, HRE achieved new status as an international policy priority. The Declaration pronounced that HRE “is essential for the promotion and achievement of stable and harmonious relations among communities and for fostering mutual understanding, tolerance, and peace” (Mihr and Schmitz 2007: 987). One year later, the

UN Decade for Human Rights (1994-2005) was launched by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in coordination with UNESCO, and a four-pronged plan of action was undertaken to: 1) build and strengthen national human rights education programs; 2) develop HRE education materials; 3) strengthen mass media in relation to HRE; and 4) undertake efforts that disseminate the UDHR throughout the world (United Nations A/51/506/Add.1).

For Baxi (1997), the UNDHRE holds promise in promoting and advancing HRE and subsequently strengthening respect for human rights, yet does not resolve an enduring dilemma—that is, HRE must “simultaneously disempower as well as empower the state” (5). Cardenas (2005) sees this dilemma as a puzzle, asking, “why would states, most of which violate human rights norms to one degree or another, encourage dissent and risk the undermining of their very legitimacy?” (364) Previous explanations of HRE as a matter of global norm diffusion are explicitly brought into question here, as is the central premise of HRE, that “a culture of human rights [through HRE] can actually be constructed” (374). Keet (2007) expounds substantially upon the conceptual assumptions that underline this central premise and the ways in which these assumptions were ideationally and institutionally constructed and reified overtime. His historical-conceptual analysis periodizes the development of HRE into three broad phases. The pre-1947 phase considers the roots of HRE from Greco-Roman times; the second phase, 1948 to 1994 reflects the formalization of HRE as an educational effort aimed at legitimizing human rights universals; and the third phase, beginning in 1995 traces the proliferation of HRE, beginning with the proclamation of the UNDHRE (1995-2004) and including the subsequent World Program for Human Rights (2007-2019). For each period, Keet (2007) notes HRE’s conceptual incongruities that serve to highlight further the “declarationist” stance taken by states who choose to adopt HRE while still committing, by omission or commission, rights violations. Further still and most significant for our purposes, Keet (2007) explicitly references these violations, noting with irony that, “the ‘age of rights’ also witnessed 169,202,000 government inspired murders (cited by Freeman 2002: 2)...a worldwide incapacity for peace; an escalation of wars...and the exposure of a widespread human rights hy-

pocrisy in ‘western democracies’...as far as world peace [is] concerned” (Keet 2007: 45).

The historical/conceptual analyses reviewed help to make clear the ways in which HRE is in many ways a house built on shifting sands. By tracing the differing institutions involved in HRE as well as the evolution of ideas about HRE that these institutions put forward, they also partly explain variance in models and definitions of HRE programming, while nevertheless remaining faithful to HRE’s central, meliorating premise. In this way, important questions remain unexplained or explained away. For example, how might HRE be developed and implemented such that the state is duly empowered and disempowered? How might HRE be calibrated to address different rights violations by state and non-state¹ actors? And as mentioned previously, what are truly reconciliatory models of HRE programming? The researchers do not endeavor to answer these questions within the scope of this article, though hope to pave the way for future efforts (their own and others) to do so. To that end, their account begins where Keet’s (2007) ends as they proceed by offering a narrative of HRE in the post-Cold War era that delimits further Keet’s third period (1994 to the present) and that brings into sharper focus the mass violations of rights resulting in a sharp rise in protracted conflict within and between nations throughout this time. It is precisely these events, the researchers argue, that to varying degrees have resulted in the proliferation of HRE activities and the ensuing shift to global citizenship education undertaken by UN agencies, NGO’s, education ministries, and education scholars and practitioners as well as differences and divergence in their approaches.

HRE AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR

Between 1994 and 2014, warfare and conflict changed substantially and also occurred on an unprecedented scale (Kaplan 2002; Wallenstein and Sollenberg 1995). Inter-ethnic and sectarian conflict typified intra-state war in the 1990’s while terrorism and sectarian conflict became the predominant modes of warfare in the 2000’s. Warfare and conflict are the result of and also result in massive violations of human rights perpetrated by state and non-state actors as well as civilians. It is these violations against which human

rights education is deployed as one of the predominant means of building a culture of human rights—cultures in which such violations would not be permitted, or so the logic goes. Belief in the transformative potential of human rights and human rights education was openly discussed at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights (Boyle, 1995); so too was the unforeseen expanse of ethnic conflict across Africa (for example, Burundi, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan) and in the Middle East (Iraq) (ibid.). After all, it had only been a few years since Fukayama and Bloom (1989) had famously declared “the end of history as such” (x); widespread optimism in what would no doubt be the spread of liberal democracy had been swiftly replaced by a deep uncertainty at how to make sense of, let alone address mounting atrocities.

The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (United Nations 1993) adopted by the Conference put forward a declaration with regards to human rights education, stating that:

HRE [is] essential for the promotion and achievement of stable and harmonious relations among communities and fostering mutual understanding, tolerance, and peace. The World Conference recommends that States develop specific programs and strategies for ensuring the widest human rights education and the dissemination of public information. Governments, with the assistance of intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, and non-governmental organizations should promote an increased awareness of human rights and mutual tolerance. The proclamation of a United Nations decade for human rights education in order to promote, encourage, and focus these educational activities should be considered.

In 1994, when the UN General Assembly decided to implement the UN Decade for Human Rights Education, all member states in theory, were committed to undertaking measures and activities that promoted and incorporated HRE in formal and non-formal education sectors. NGO's were seen as key partners in the promotion and implementation of HRE programs into national plans of action (Mihir and Schmitz 2007). The Human Rights Education Association (HREA), founded the same year, created an internet based HRE resource and teaching network which offered members web-based HRE learning courses and opportunities to concep-

tually and practically develop ideas and approaches to HRE; the site also served as an online archive for documents pertaining to HRE (for example, UN Resolutions, Plans of Action).

Both UNESCO and OHCHR emphasized promoting HRE from political, legal, and organizational points of view (Ugarte 2005). In practice, this meant developing and making available curricula designed to impart content-based knowledge of rights Covenants and Treaties. For example, Amnesty International's 1996 curriculum, “Our World, Our Rights” developed for elementary school students, encapsulates this approach by opening with “human rights are only rights when people know about them and can therefore exercise them” (Ugarte 2005: 15). Many of the suggested activities are dynamic (for example, an adapted “Shoots and Ladders” board game board which leads students up and down different articles of the UDHR on different parts of the board or a role playing game in which students are asked to play rights victims and violators), yet nevertheless are instrumental rather than experiential in their design. Legally, efforts were directed towards States openly and formally declaring their intention to implement HRE in national legislation. For example, “experts of UN and the Council of Europe” publicly gave “Croatia an excellent opinion on the quality of their National Program” which “incorporated into legislation a National Program for HRE at pre-school, primary, and secondary school levels” (HREA email “Legislative and Policy framework of the UN Decade, July 17, 2000).

That Croatia had just emerged from a five-year civil war² meant HRE was part of an overall peace-building plan to help prevent further conflict between Croats and ethnic Serbians who had engaged in sustained internecine conflict; the former group had supported Croatian independence from Yugoslavia while the later opposed it. In neighboring Bosnia, where Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had been embroiled since 1992 in a war characterized by bitter fighting, indiscriminate shelling of cities and towns, and ethnic cleansing,³³ See: Naimark, N.M. (2002). *Fires of hatred: Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe.*³⁴ HRE was implemented immediately after the 1995 ceasefire by UN agencies in a manner that demonstrated the constraints of a contents-based approach. One aid worker reported, “in Bosnia, our job was to disseminate information about human rights through a se-

ries of workshops...this information was not interesting to people who had just lost five family members...they were teaching principles saying you have a right to life without any mention of how to go about ensuring that right” (Holland 2011: 14).

In these same years, 1991 to 1996, intra-state conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Burundi, Congo, Chechnya, Georgia, Sierra Leone, and Algeria (along with Croatia and Bosnia) would result in 1,568,500 deaths (Sarkees et al. 2003: 61) and approximately ten million asylum seekers who had been forcibly displaced to neighboring countries (Castles 2003). Inter-state wars in theory (though in many cases not in practice) maintain a separation between battlefield and home front. In contrast, these intra-state, “inter-ethnic conflicts,” took place at close-range, frequently between neighbors, people who had coexisted for years. IR scholars, whose focus since the discipline’s inception had been devoted to predicting and explaining the occurrence of interstate war (Mearsheimer 2007; Van Evera 2013), sought now to explain large-scale ethnic conflicts, and the mass violence that often inhered (Duffy and Toft 2002; Kalyvas 2003; Toft 2003).

The models they used to do so were not new, extending the Rational Actor Model (RAM) of interstate conflict to account for intrastate conflict. RAM predicts that interstate conflict occurs when: 1) states are uncertain with regards to their capabilities to maximize resources and compete with one another—in other words, conflict exposes capabilities and 2) when states know the relative capabilities of other states and reach agreement to allocate resources, but cannot ensure that states will credibly commit to upholding these agreements (Fearon 1995). When applying these theories to intrastate conflict, IR literature substitutes the terms “ethnic group,” “clans,” “tribes,” or “rebel groups” for the term “state.” RAM is also predicated upon the twin assumptions that sovereign states act in their own self-interest and in are competition with one another over a finite amount of material resources and because there is no supra-state system of governance to mediate competition for resources. Finally, states are ultimately interested in maintain their own sovereignty or alternately phrased, to survive (Fearon 1995). In intrastate conflict, the state which might have previously mediated these relationships between ethnic

groups/tribes is now either monopolized and represents the interests of one group (for example, Iraq under Ba’athist rule) or has collapsed, resulting in a power vacuum over which groups are propelled to fight to seize control (for example, Somalia)

In relation to emergent HRE models previously reviewed, it is hard to imagine the ways in which basic knowledge of human rights and the UDHR (i.e. the Values and Awareness and/or the Accountability Model) might prevent conflict resulting from asymmetrical access to material resources between groups or the use of the state to monopolize resources for one group. Similarly, normative notions of pluralism (i.e. HRE for coexistence) and imagining oneself as part of a larger imagined community (i.e. HRE for Global Citizenship) will fall short if that imagined community is representative of the interests of one group at the expense of the others. Ultimately, these models by in large disavow the reasons actors/groups partake in violent actions—something real and immediate is at stake (for example, political representation, access to economic opportunities) which they perceive as necessary to ensure their own survival.

In more than half of the states listed above, HRE was formally adopted by national legislative bodies or on these states’ behalf by the UN General Assembly as a measure of post-conflict peace-building in the same year a cease-fire was declared. On the heels of these came new conflicts (for example, Kosovo, East Timor) and the renewal of old conflicts (for example, Congo, Liberia). By the end of the twentieth century, HRE as a “human right [had] been articulated in ninety-two provisions in international and regional covenants, protocols, conventions, declarations, principles, guidelines, resolutions, and recommendations” (United Nations 1999 cited by Keet 2007: 45). However, five years into the UNDHRE, a mid-term evaluation conducted in 2000 concluded that, “less than twenty-percent of all member states had [even] replied to the evaluation questionnaire, while less than a dozen had begun to elaborate some sort of National HRE-Plan of Action” (Mihir and Schmitz 2007: 988). Yet, unswerving faith in HRE to address the sharp rise in armed conflicts throughout the world was affirmed in the Evaluation’s concluding pages, notably that “human rights education is an important strategy for achieving...the prevention of conflict, conflict resolution,

peacemaking, and peace-building...the Decade remains the sole mechanism for global mobilization of strategies for HRE” (United Nations A/55/360: 23).

Per the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation, national, regional, and international institutions and NGO’s involved in HRE approached the remaining five years of the decade by developing better coordinating mechanisms and focusing on the wider distribution of HRE materials translated into local languages. They also published a handful of new curricular programs that aimed to develop respect for rights “to, in, and through education” (Tomasevski 2003: i), with marked emphasis placed on the relationship between democratic, inclusive citizenship and human rights education. UNESCO prepared and distributed regionally-adapted HRE course packs (for example, *Education for Human Rights and Democracy in Southern Africa*, 2001) which focused on history as a subject through which narratives of dispossession, displacement, and rights violations could be utilized to frame activities and discussions around citizenship.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the resultant “War on Terror” that followed did not halt this seemingly upward trend in dissemination and implementation of HRE programming. Indeed the proliferation of HRE initiatives and organizations involved continued (Keet 2007). However, HRE “now came under increasing pressure to align itself with matters of...terrorism,” (Keet 2007: 78) an entirely altogether new form of conflict that like inter-ethnic conflict confounded efforts of IR scholars to understand and explain it (Byers 2002; Fox 2001; Kalyvus 2004). As evinced in an *Evaluation of UNESCO Publications on Human Rights Education*, it is argued that “terrorism” was inadequately covered in the [HRE] materials” (ii). When the UNHRE drew to a close in 2004, as interstate war to “combat terrorism” was underway in Afghanistan and another was being contemplated in Iraq, plans were already in motion for a second HRE decade (United Nations E/CN.5/2003/101: 7). On December 10, 2004 the UN General Assembly concluded the first Decade and simultaneously proclaimed the World Program for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) (United Nations A/RES/59/113, 2004), a three-phased program that would run from 2005 to 2019.

The Concluding Report on the UNHRE indicated that in the interim five years since the Mid-Term Evaluation, an additional seventeen countries (twenty-nine in total) had undertaken steps to incorporate HRE within national school systems. These efforts included the adoption of HRE laws and policies; the development and revision of curricula; and the revision of textbooks to eliminate stereotypes and reflect human rights principles (United Nations E/CN.4/2004/93). However, the Report also identified that far more needed to be done by way of curricular reform and approaches to HRE that “foster mutual understanding and peace among and between peoples” in order to combat “disbelief and mistrust...fertile ground on which terrorism and intolerance thrive” (4).

Previously, scholarly assumptions generally aligned with popular opinion that “terrorists” actions were irrational and therefore generally unpredictable and inexplicable. However, far from attributing terrorism to “irrational” disbelief and mistrust,” which might map on to the Transformational Model of HRE/HRE for Transformative Action, IR scholars have now developed theories and undertaken studies that explain the rational calculations undertaken by actors who participate in terrorist actions (Lake, 2002; McCormick, 2003). Their logic generally follows the same contours as the rational actor model used to explain both inter- and intra-state conflict. Importantly, these studies show that: 1) countries with low levels of civil liberties and political rights but with high gross-domestic product (GDP) are more likely to have their citizens involved in insurgencies whose focus is on ‘local targets;’ 2) international terrorism tends to be motivated by local concerns; and 3) terrorists care about influencing political outcomes. In comparison, citizens of countries with low levels of civil liberties, political rights, and low GDP are more likely to participate in “ethnic conflict” (Krueger and Maleckova 2002).

In developing a Plan of Action for the WPHRE, OHCHR and UNESCO aimed to: 1) take specific action in primary and secondary schools; 2) endow programs with resources (material and financial) that helped train teachers and other public personnel in HRE; and 3) focus on media and freedom of the press in order to shed light on human rights abuses (United Nations A/59/525/Rev.1). These three objectives align with the three chronological phases of the

HRE program. Phase I (2005-2009) aimed to develop concrete strategies and practical ideas for implementing human rights nationally (United Nations 59/113 B 2005); Phase II (2010-2014) focused on HRE in higher education and on human rights training programs for teachers and educators (United Nations A/HRC/15/28); and Phase III (2015-2019) will focus on promoting human rights training for media professionals and journalists. Despite what might appear to be more concrete actions towards the wider implementation of HRE, Keet (2007) remarks that the conceptualization of HRE in the Plan of Action for the WPHRE (United Nations UN/GA/A/59/525/Rev.1 2005) “represents an almost uneventful continuity with the construction of HRE in the UNDHRE” (79). That is, content-driven with declarationism (in practice if not in theory) by in large prioritized over deep and sustained political and social transformation.

During Phase I of the WPHRE, seventy-six countries indicated that they had put policy measures for HRE in place. Alone, this three-fold increase in just five years might signify the same declarationism witnessed in the previous Decade. However, the Final Evaluation of the First Phase indicated increasing recognition by a broad range of human rights practitioners from all continents that a “rights-based approach includes human rights through education and human rights in education—ensuring that the rights of all members of the school community are respected” (United Nations A/65/322 2010). For example, Amnesty International’s “Human Rights Friendly Schools Project” indicates a shift from their previous emphasis on content (for example, their 1996 ‘Our World, Our Rights’ program). As a means of building a “global culture of human rights,” the ‘Friendly School Program’ states that:

Placing human rights at the heart of the learning experience and making human rights is an integral part of everyday school life. From the way decisions are made in schools, to the way people treat each other, to the curriculum and extra-curricular activities on offer, right down to the very surroundings in which students are taught, the school becomes an exemplary model for human rights education.

Representative of several other programs developed by NGO’s that were implemented in a wide-range of countries, schools were becoming understood as sites where rights were

learned, taught, practiced, respected, protected, and promoted (Mihir 2009).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, IR scholars had developed stable theories of intra-state conflict and terrorism; they had also begun to question the entire notion of the “changing character of war”—or rather, the premise that violence in the post-Cold War era was occurring in unprecedented ways on new scales. They concluded that the wars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries are “wars amongst the people” in which the political effects of military actions may be more important than their immediate military effects (Strachan and Scheipers 2011). However, state and non-state actors are not in-fact opposites, “not the least because many non-state actors aspire to statehood and few seem hell-bent on destroying their own state or the ideas of the state in general” (Strachan and Scheipers 2011: 358). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, conflict of all kinds “marks the disruption of order—it is the making and unmaking of certainties, of meaning, and potentially the coordinates of social and political life” (Strachan and Scheipers 2011: 532). It is precisely these coordinates that HRE, at its reaches, has the potential to maintain or remake. However, the researchers have only just begun to conceptualize how this might be so and further conceptual development might well be curtailed.

As the WPHRE transitioned to Phase II in 2010, the notion of ‘Global Citizenship’ began to appear and circulate in HRE materials, particularly those published by UNESCO. As previously discussed, Bajaj (2011) identified HRE for Global Citizenship as one of three predominate approaches to HRE programming in the year 2011. NGO’s were starting to develop “global citizenship” curricula (Oxfam’s Global Citizenship Guides) and UNESCO began to discuss their Associated Schools as sites that fostered global citizenship (Dill 2013). Subtly but surely, global citizenship and global citizenship education were on the rise. So too were sectarianism and religious extremism, with sectarian conflicts flaring, first in Iraq and then in Syria. Systemic and widespread “othering” and fear of “Islam” in “the West” and secularism in the Middle East and Central Asia also brought these conflicts into classrooms throughout the world (Jackson 2010). Global Citizenship Education (GCE) that would facilitate and strengthen a supposedly nascent “global consciousness” (UNESCO 2013)

was increasingly advanced as the education paradigm necessary to address “global challenges,” most notably among them “violence,” “extremism,” and “insecurity” (UNESCO 2013).

The launch of GEFI in 2012 signaled explicit support by UN agencies for GCE. In a 2013 consultation on Global Citizenship Education sponsored by UNESCO that took place in Seoul, South Korea, human rights and human rights education were discussed as inherent to global citizenship education (UNESCO 2013). However, whereas HRE had once been endowed with the responsibility to “promote and achieve... stable and harmonious relations among communities... for fostering a mutual understanding of tolerance and peace” (UNESCO 1993) the task now fell to GCE to build a “more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure, and sustainable world” (UNESCO, 2013). The Learning Metrics Task Force had already commissioned a Global Citizenship Education Working Group that was attempting to define GCE, given wide variance in approaches to GCE programming (Davies et al. 2005). Additionally, the Working Group and UNESCO were considering how to translate GCE materials into local languages and how to facilitate the adoption of GCE into countries’ curricula, “one of the most urgent tasks.” Meanwhile, Phase II of WPHRE will soon draw to a close, though no formal steps have yet been undertaken to launch Phase III.

HRE AND GCE—OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

As the researchers have outlined throughout, HRE and GCE share similarly stated goals (for example, tolerance, peace) as well as approaches and strategies (for example, implementation in national curricula); additionally, many of the same institutions and actors who once were at the fore of advocating for HRE have now shifted their attention to GCE. The researchers have introduced how GCE entered the stage through UNESCO and more recently through GEFI, but they would be remiss to not briefly explain the twin perspectives that undergird the current interest in and shift in focus to GCE — namely the discourses of global consciousness and the discourse of global competencies. While many scholars juxtapose global competencies and global consciousness as having contradictory or competing purposes, the researchers

agree with others who suggest that both foci carry a global imaginary that rests on liberal ideas of individualism, modernity and progress (Dill 2011), and that this transformation from HRE is evolutionary more than revolutionary. According to Dill (2011: 131) the “liberal-humanist and the corporate capitalist interests overlap in this global citizen ideal around the value they both place in autonomous self-creation.” He further explains that the discourse of global competencies imagines a particular self that is flexible, multiple, adaptable, tolerant, creative, a problem-solver, technologically savvy, media wise and importantly, an agent of change (Dill 2011). Built largely on ideals of individualism these competencies are largely a blend of technical-rational and dispositional skills that are economically useful and lead to prosperity and thriving in the global marketplace. Proponents (Partnerships for 21c Schools, International Baccalaureate, OECD, UNESCO, GEFI) broadly suggest that different skills are required today and the purpose of education is to prepare the individual for the changing world by creating an enterprising self (Dill 2011). This particular discourse reveals the global citizen ideal that matches quite closely to the ideal of the worker under a global capitalist system.

The hallmark of post-industrial, capitalism are so-called global competencies such as flexibility and creativity - and many of these related skills and virtues are expressed in the discourses of global citizenship education.

If the researchers now look closely at global citizenship education expressed through global consciousness discourses they can see that it primarily seeks to organize difference through the widespread embrace of values like “benevolence, justice, tolerance and human rights and claims them as universally valid and essential components of cosmopolitan thriving and a better world. Celebrating difference and affirming diversity as a good in itself become core tenants of the universal faith of global consciousness” (Dill 2011: 152). Contemporary efforts to organize difference and teach about human rights in global citizenship education have often been projections of a particular form of Western liberalism disguised as global consciousness that unintentionally marginalizes diversity (See Spreen and Monaghan 2015; Dill 2011; Keet 2007).

For these reasons the researchers suggest that the shift to GCE has not been without consequence, particularly with regards to developing and implementing educational programming able to, in part, prevent and reconcile violent conflict. HRE has always walked a fine balance between, on the one hand, raising awareness about rights and addressing international conventions, treaties, and protocols and, on the other, educating citizens about how to appeal to their governments to fulfill them. Like HRE, GCE also appears to strike a balance between teaching about identity and citizenship that transcends national borders. However, unlike HRE, which endeavors to uphold rights put forth in recognized treaties and conventions via the building or strengthening of rights-respecting cultures within and between states, GCE aims to bring into being a supposed latent global consciousness that promotes tolerance within a benign global market economy. GCE does little to take on the structural inequities that global competition, Western liberalism and individualism produce.

The researchers know that actors partaking in intra-state conflict more often than not do so to gain or retain access to scarce resources necessary for their survival. When one group utilizes state apparatuses to monopolize those resources, marginalized, disenfranchised groups often engage in conflict against the state. Emerging perspectives on GCE more often than not declare simply that “global challenges...call for collective actions at the global level;” however, GCE obscures the roots of those challenges—that is, structural inequality brought on by global economic capitalism and by systemic violations by state and non-state actors of political, social, cultural, and economic rights.

At this juncture, international attention, momentum, and funding are being directed away from education that explicitly aims to strengthen and promote universally recognized international rights and treaties, towards education that aims to re-imagine identities and citizenship as part of a new thriving cosmopolitan collective transcending national borders and local communities if only individuals can acquire the right skills. To be sure, respect for human rights is part of GCE, alongside of “equity, acceptance of diversity, supporting peace, and sustainable development” (UNESCO 2013). Yet, it is worth stating again that in relation to these issues, human rights are at the same time viewed as the

“cause, effect, problem, and possible solution” (Kirk and Winthrop 2007: 20). Thus, as human rights educators and practitioners, the researchers must ask themselves: what are the reaches and limits of human rights education to strengthen participatory governance structures that better represent the diverse array of interests of all citizens within a given nation-state? And, is global citizenship education the way forward to expand and promote human rights or does it represent a detour that encourages learners to embrace the dominant market-based values in global capitalist systems under the umbrella of global citizenship? In what remains, by way of addressing these questions, the researchers briefly examine key principles that they suggest are inherent to cultivating rights-respecting citizens and that offer potential ways forward for HRE.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, relationships, reflection, and action—the affective dimension of HRE—challenge students to consider the ways in which they come to know and understand themselves, each other, and their ability to act as rights-respecting citizens who advocate for participatory governance structures representative of the diverse array of interests of all citizens in communities in which they live. In this article, the researchers have argued that, considering the development of HRE, and the recent shifting emphasis from HRE to GCE, in relation to the acceleration of globalization and the changing character of war in the post-Cold War era help to make clear the limits and reaches of HRE to prevent and reconcile war and conflict and increasing global inequities, which are the result of and also result in massive violations of human rights. GCE, more often than not, affords primacy to the affective dimension of rights, avoiding or excluding altogether the legal dimension. Students are encouraged to feel part of a global community, take action by traveling to see and experience other cultures (for example, study abroad programming), and exercise agency as more informed consumers on the global marketplace who can vote with their dollars. In short, unlike HRE which, at its best, pairs affective and legal dimensions, providing students with tools to question and challenge the status quo, GCE runs the risk of simply reproducing it.

Students throughout the world have and will continue to be confronted with hard, sometimes impossible choices about whether they will participate, by omission or commission, in the perpetuation of conflict. For many, violence or armed conflict are envisioned as one way of making changes to the rights violations they experience at the hands of state or non-state actors. At its best, human rights education arms students with the legal and affective knowledge and experience to change rights violations without committing others. To UN agencies, NGO's, national ministries, and educators, in the face of inter-ethnic conflict in the Crimea, insurgency in Iraq, sectarian conflict in Syria, and dozens of other past and on-going conflicts, the researchers give a renewed call to arms for HRE.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the course of its evolution, human rights educators have increasingly recognized that human rights education (HRE) requires the combining of legal perspectives with an affective dimension. It is this affective dimension towards which the researchers now direct their focus as law and attendant knowledge of the law only provide the starting point for the process of change. Stated differently, much is known about how to educate for the content of rights, but far less about how to educate for the practice of rights. The researchers suggest that three inter-related core principles, inherent in all rights treaties, covenants, and declarations are constitutive of the practice of rights: relationships, reflection, and action. Elsewhere, the researchers have explicated the conceptual framework that underlies these three core principles and demonstrated their application in an HRE curriculum developed and implemented in both high school and higher education programs. Possibilities exist for managing diversity in classrooms utilizing HRE curricula through relying upon storytelling and including shared narratives. In the snapshot included below, shared narratives are the starting point for leveraging diversity in classrooms to mobilize for action against rights abuses.

Here, the researchers note that relationships forged between classmates through sharing and/or hearing the testimonies of others' life histories provide opportunities to listen and discuss first-hand accounts of rights violations or alternately instances where rights were defended or

respected. HRE must include discussions of power, position, role and status in global capitalist system. When HRE fails to engage students in deep learning about social injustice or develop a concrete understanding about how to enact or advocate for rights, it leaves them ill-equipped to make sense of the many global border crossings they will make in their own lives. For many students, particularly those who are most vulnerable and living in highly unequal societies, whose rights are and continue to be violated, *education about human rights* appears out of synch with their realities of living in an unequal and inequitable global world. In this way, the researchers argue that rights aren't "out there" but become immediate and personalized and the stories people share become powerful tools against propaganda, political dogmas, and all manner of impositions and stereotypes. Reflection—oral, written, and/or performative—of the range of emotions (for example, sadness, anger, frustration, hope) that often arise in the process of building relationships and gaining knowledge about rights violations helps students to critically consider their own role as agents in perpetuating or alternately changing the conditions under which rights violations occur. The researchers suggest revisiting Freire's notion of conscientization and using HRE to uncover and explore the impact of globalization while examining students' own role and complexity in structural inequality as core tenants of reflection. Finally, opportunities for students to take action (for example, awareness raising or advocacy campaigns) that address rights violations in their communities allow students to practice agency and participate in change on a personal, immediate scale. The researchers hope to have demonstrated how in their own work they have promoted the interaction between human rights education and critical praxis, and the ways in which both facilitate transformative human rights based educational programming. In another article the researchers capture and explain the curricular and pedagogic processes; students' perceptions of global citizenship and themselves as global citizens; as well as students' sense of engagement with their community, and how they used this knowledge to act. The researchers' definition builds on concepts of social justice, which consider civic learning as responsible activism that recognizes the individual's connections to social issues in their own community and throughout the world.

NOTES

- 1 Entities that participate or act in international relations with sufficient power to influence and cause change to state behavior even though they do not belong to any established institution of a state. See: Keck ME & Sikkink K 1998. Transnational advocacy networks in the movement society. *The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century*, 217-238.
- 2 See: Silber L & Little A 1996. *The death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin.
- 3 See: Naimark, NM. (2002). *Fires of hatred: Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

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